Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Edited by Justin Healey

ISSUES IN SOCIETY

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Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism is Volume 410 in the 'Issues in Society' series of educational resource books. The aim of this series is to offer current, diverse information about important issues in our world, from an Australian perspective.

KEY ISSUES IN THIS TOPIC
Acts of terror and expressions of violent extremism are a confronting reality around the globe, and an ongoing threat in this country. Australians must remain vigilant against the spread of terror and extremism by supporters of Islamic State and other ideologically violent groups.

How should Australia deal with the terrorist threat without unfairly targeting Muslim communities or infringing upon fundamental human rights? Why are some young Australians being drawn to radical Islamism? The factors that result in radicalisation are complex and varied – are there smarter ways to counter violent extremism?

This book focuses on the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Australia and abroad; examines national security strategies and counter-terrorism laws in Australia; and explores ways of effectively countering extremism and radicalisation. How do we turn back the tide of fear in an age of increasing terror?

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Titles in the 'Issues in Society' series are individual resource books which provide an overview on a specific subject comprised of facts and opinions.

The information in this resource book is not from any single author, publication or organisation. The unique value of the ‘Issues in Society’ series lies in its diversity of content and perspectives.

The content comes from a wide variety of sources and includes:
- Newspaper reports and opinion pieces
- Website fact sheets
- Magazine and journal articles
- Statistics and surveys
- Government reports
- Literature from special interest groups

CRITICAL EVALUATION
As the information reproduced in this book is from a number of different sources, readers should always be aware of the origin of the text and whether or not the source is likely to be expressing a particular bias or agenda.

It is hoped that, as you read about the many aspects of the issues explored in this book, you will critically evaluate the information presented. In some cases, it is important that you decide whether you are being presented with facts or opinions. Does the writer give a biased or an unbiased report? If an opinion is being expressed, do you agree with the writer?

EXPLORING ISSUES
The ‘Exploring issues’ section at the back of this book features a range of ready-to-use worksheets relating to the articles and issues raised in this book. The activities and exercises in these worksheets are suitable for use by students at middle secondary school level and beyond.

FURTHER RESEARCH
This title offers a useful starting point for those who need convenient access to information about the issues involved. However, it is only a starting point. The ‘Web links’ section at the back of this book contains a list of useful websites which you can access for more reading on the topic.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FROM THE LATEST ‘GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX’, PRODUCED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE

This is the fourth edition of the Global Terrorism Index which provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 16 years, covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2015.

Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The Global Terrorism Database is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity globally and has now codified over 150,000 terrorist incidents.

The research presented in this report highlights a complex and rapidly changing set of dynamics in global terrorism. While on the one hand the top-line statistics highlight an improvement in the levels of global terrorism, the continued intensification of terrorism in some countries is a cause for serious concern, and highlights the fluid nature of modern terrorist activity.

The complexity of this year’s GTI is underscored by the fact that although 76 countries improved their GTI scores compared to 53 countries that worsened, the overall global GTI score deteriorated by six per cent since last year as many moderately affected countries experienced record levels of terrorism.

The 2016 GTI finds there has been a change from the pattern of the previous four years. 2015 saw the total number of deaths decrease by ten per cent, the first decline since 2010.

The number of countries recording a death from terrorism also decreased by one. This decline in terrorism deaths is mainly attributed to a weakened Boko Haram and ISIL in both Nigeria and Iraq due to the military operations against them. However, expanded activities by both of these groups in other countries is posing new threats in other parts of the world. Boko Haram has expanded into Niger, Cameroon and Chad, increasing the number of people they have killed through terrorism in these three countries by 157 per cent. Meanwhile ISIL and its affiliates were active in 15 new countries, bringing the total number of countries they were active in to 28. This is largely why a record number of countries recorded their highest levels of terrorism in any year in the past 16 years.

There was a ten per cent decline from 2014 in the number of terrorism deaths in 2015 resulting in 3,389 fewer people being killed. Iraq and Nigeria together recorded 5,556 fewer deaths and 1,030 fewer attacks than in 2014. However, with a global total of 29,376 deaths, 2015 was still the second deadliest year on record.

While the weakening of ISIL and Boko Haram in their central areas of operations in Iraq and Nigeria is positive, this change has coincided with two key negative trends which have driven up terrorism in the rest of the world.
While terrorism as a form of violence has a major psychological impact on the societies it touches, there are other forms of violence which are more devastating. Major armed conflicts resulted in more deaths in 2015 as well as the wholesale destruction of economies. The global homicide rate is 15 times the death rate from terrorism.
grievances and political violence with terrorist activity. When analysing the correlates of terrorism there are different factors that are statistically significant depending on the level of development. In the OECD countries, socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, militarisation, levels of criminality, access to weapons and distrust in the electoral process are the most statistically significant factors correlating with terrorism. This reinforces some of the well-known drivers of radicalisation and extremism. In developing countries, the history of conflict, levels of corruption, acceptance of the rights of others and group based inequalities are more significantly related to terrorist activity.

Individual terrorist acts are unpredictable but the report highlights some common statistical patterns. These patterns help inform the future deadliness of terrorist organisations, the trends in their tactics and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations.

The 2016 GTI report reinforces the fact terrorism is a highly concentrated form of violence, mostly committed in a small number of countries and by a small number of groups. The five countries suffering the highest impact from terrorism as measured by the GTI; Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria, accounted for 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. Similarly, only four groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all these deaths; ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida.

This report also includes commentary on various aspects of terrorism. This includes efforts to understand terrorism such as Maggiolini and Varvelli from ISPI who explore why there are hotbeds of radicalisation, and Schori Liang from GCSP who looks at the connection between criminal networks and terrorism. There are also explanations of what is being done to discourage and prevent the spread of terrorism. The Victoria Police Counter Terrorism Command’s Specialist Intelligence Team describe their experiences with community-driven prevention, Cunningham and Koser from GCERF outline the role the private sector can play in preventing violent extremism, and von Einsiedel from the United Nations University Center for Policy Research describes the history of the UN’s work to resolve conflicts is stemming terrorism.

While terrorism as a form of violence has a major psychological impact on the societies it touches, there are other forms of violence which are more devastating. Major armed conflicts resulted in more deaths in 2015 as well as the wholesale destruction of economies. The global homicide rate is 15 times the death rate from terrorism.

KEY FINDINGS

2016 GTI RESULTS

• Seventy-six countries improved their scores in the 2016 GTI while 53 countries deteriorated. However, the overall GTI score deteriorated by six per cent since last year due to many countries experiencing record levels of terrorism.

• The five countries with the highest impact from terrorism as measured by the GTI are Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria. These five countries accounted for 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015.

• Deaths from terrorism decreased by ten per cent in 2015 to 29,376. This is the first decrease in number of deaths recorded since 2010.

• Iraq and Nigeria had the biggest decreases with 5,556 fewer deaths. This constitutes a 32 per cent reduction in these two countries since 2014.

• In OECD member countries, deaths from terrorism dramatically increased in 2015, rising by 650 per cent when compared to 2014. Twenty-one of the 34 OECD countries experienced at least one terrorist
attack with the majority of deaths occurring in Turkey and France.
• ISIL-affiliated groups undertook attacks in 28 countries in 2015, up from 13 countries in 2014.
• There were 274 known terrorist groups that carried out an attack in 2015, of these 103 groups did not kill anyone.
• Twenty-three countries recorded their highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2015. This is six more than the previous high of 17 countries in 2014.

TRENDS
• Of the last 16 years, the worst year for terrorism was 2014 with 93 countries experiencing an attack and 32,765 people killed.
• Since 2006, 98 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the US have resulted from attacks carried out by lone actors, resulting in 156 deaths.
• ISIL foreign fighters who have gone to Syria generally have high levels of education but low incomes, with many fighters joining in part due to a feeling of exclusion in their home countries.
• There were 18 deaths caused by ISIL-affiliated attacks in the OECD in 2014. This number increased significantly in 2015, to 313 deaths from 67 attacks.
• Half of all plots with an ISIL connection have been conducted by people who have had no direct contact with ISIL.

TERRORIST GROUPS
• In 2015 four groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all deaths from terrorism: ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida.
• ISIL surpassed Boko Haram as the deadliest terrorist group in 2015. ISIL undertook attacks in 252 different cities in 2015 and was responsible for 6,141 deaths in the year.
• Boko Haram had an 18 per cent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 5,478 deaths during the year.
• Al-Qa’ida had a 17 per cent reduction in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 1,620 deaths in the year.
• The Taliban in Afghanistan had a 29 per cent increase in the number of people it killed in 2015, responsible for 4,502 deaths from terrorism during the year.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM
• The global economic impact of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion in 2015, decreasing by 15 per cent from its 2014 level.
• Iraq is the country suffering the highest economic impact from terrorism, reaching 17 per cent of its GDP in 2015.
• Tourism’s contribution to GDP is twice as large in countries with no terrorist attacks compared to countries with attacks.
• The economic resources devoted to peacekeeping and peacebuilding represent two per cent of the economic impact of armed conflict and terrorism.

CORRELATES AND DRIVERS OF TERRORISM
• Ninety-three per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of state-sponsored terror – extra-judicial deaths, torture and imprisonment without trial.
• Over 90 per cent of all terrorism attacks occurred in countries engaged in violent conflicts.
• Only 0.5 per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that did not suffer from conflict or political terror.
• Terrorism is more likely to occur in OECD member countries with poorer performance on socio-economic factors such as opportunities for youth, belief in the electoral system, levels of criminality and access to weapons.
• In both OECD and non-OECD countries terrorism is statistically related to the acceptance of the rights of others, good relations with neighbours, likelihood of violent demonstrations and political terror.
• Individual terrorist acts are unpredictable but follow common statistical patterns. This aids in understanding similarities between terrorist organisations, their tactics and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations.

This bulletin is reissued quarterly and does not suggest an increased threat level. It contains new information on attacks in Turkey, Bangladesh, France and Malaysia. The period around the holy month of Ramadan (June/July 2016) has seen a spike in attacks. The influence of ISIL in South-East Asia continues to grow. Attacks in Nice, Dhaka and other locations indicate a trend toward relatively unsophisticated, yet deadly, attacks against soft targets. Always subscribe to the travel advice for your destination. Conditions can change suddenly. We recommend you:

- Subscribe to updates
- Register your travel plans
- Get the right travel insurance
- Follow us on Facebook and Twitter.

This bulletin should be read in conjunction with country advisories, which provide details on any specific and credible terrorism threats at your destination. Travel advice explained also outlines ways to manage risk for our country levels.

Nature of the terrorist threat
Terrorism is violence aimed at achieving political or ideological objectives. Attacks can be centrally directed from a structured organisation or network or by individuals acting without any direct external control (the so called 'lone wolf').

There is a continuing and long-standing threat of terrorist attack across the world. Since 2000, there has been a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising to 32,685 in 2014 (sourced from Institute for Economics and Peace). The countries with the most number of attacks include Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.

While locals of foreign countries are often the ones most impacted, numerous terrorist groups have demonstrated the intent and capability to attack Western interests.

The terrorist threat to Australians overseas has become more diffuse in recent years as new groups have emerged, individuals have become self-radicalised, and existing groups such as central Al-Qaeda (AQ) remain a threat. At the same time, terrorist safe havens have emerged in Mali, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria/Iraq and Yemen. This affords a wider range of groups the opportunity to plan more sophisticated attacks.

Recent events in France, Bangladesh, Turkey, United States, and Australia highlight the risks posed by individuals motivated by the current situation in Syria and Iraq.

Australia and Australians are viewed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist groups as a target for terrorist attacks. This threat extends worldwide. Even in cases where attacks may not specifically target Australian interests, Australians can, and have been, harmed in indiscriminate attacks or attacks aimed at others.

Social media and online platforms are a primary vehicle to support and encourage attacks in Western countries and against Western interests elsewhere.

These calls are intended to motivate sympathisers to attack Western interests, often in unsophisticated but lethal ways. The attack in Nice in July 2016 highlights the capacity of terrorists to conduct such attacks against soft targets in Western countries with no warning. Attacks in San Bernadino and Orlando in the United States also highlight how individuals can radicalise quickly, under the radar of local authorities.

As seen from the spike of attacks in June and July 2016, the period surrounding Ramadan presents additional risks.

Foreign fighters
A large number of foreigners are currently fighting in Syria and Iraq. Information on the action taken by the Australian Government under the Criminal Code Act 1995 against Australian fighters and on the declared area in Syria is at the National Security website.

Types of attacks
Modes of attack by terrorists may include one or a combination of the following:

- **Kidnapings**: hostage taking is a long-established terrorist tactic. Significant ransom payments are typically demanded for the kidnapping victim’s release, though most recently a number of hostages taken in Syria have been executed for ideological propaganda purposes, as described in the Kidnapping page.
- **Armed attackers**: the use of weapons such as firearms or bladed weapons often against symbolic targets such as members of the security forces, or against unarmed civilians. Such attacks have been carried out in London, Belgium, Ottawa, Dhaka and Paris in recent years, including in November.
• Vehicle attacks: In recent years, there have been several attacks using vehicles to run down civilians in crowded places or target military or police personnel. Such attacks have been carried out in France, Canada and the UK.
• **Bombings:** including the use of large and small-scale improvised explosive devices against buildings, events or public places. Improvised explosive devices were used in Boston in 2013, Bangkok in 2015 and Brussels and Lahore in 2016.
• **Suicide operations:** where attackers detonate explosives or launch direct attacks in the expectation of death. Since 2001, mass casualty suicide attacks have occurred in the US, Bali, Jakarta, London, Madrid, Paris, Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels.
• **Hijackings:** where civilian/commercial aircraft and other transport infrastructure are seized and hostages taken. This can include aircraft being used as weapons, such as the 2001 attacks in the US.
• **Other attacks on commercial aircraft and transport:** including attacks using explosives smuggled on board aircraft, portable anti-aircraft weapons (MANPADs), and using explosives-laden vessels against shipping, trains, aircraft or other forms of transport. Terrorists have demonstrated a continuing capacity to evolve their tactics and attack methods to seek to defeat changes in aviation security. Attempts were made to destroy aircraft using explosives in 2001, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2015 and 2016. An explosive device placed on a flight between Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt to St Petersburg killed 224 people in October 2015.
• **Unconventional attacks:** including the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials to cause harm. Some terrorist groups have advocated the use of unconventional weapons though this kind of attack, though developing this capability remains difficult. An attack using sarin took place in a Tokyo subway in 1995, and the UN has confirmed that sarin and other chemical weapons have been used in the Syria conflict since 2013. Militants may have used crude chemical weapons in Iraq.

**Common targets for terrorist attacks**
Terrorists may target:
• **Local government interests:** including symbols, offices and infrastructure associated with national or local governments, public transport, military and security forces bases
• **Identifiably Western interests:** including embassies, airlines, foreign oil and gas infrastructure, premises of multinational companies (including employee residential compounds) and international schools
• **Places of mass gathering:** including public buildings and infrastructure such as shopping malls, hotels, markets, public transport terminals, airports, tourist sites and public areas
• **Gatherings of Westerners:** including hotels, restaurants, nightclubs and other entertainment infrastructure catering to foreign clientele
• **Places of worship:** including mosques, churches, temples and synagogues of all faiths, as well as religious ceremonies and processions.

Travellers should be aware that significant dates, anniversaries, religious festivals and political events (such as elections) are considered symbolic by terrorists and have been used in the past to mount attacks. Terrorists have also conducted attacks in response to broader international political or social developments, such as the release of films and cartoons considered to be offensive.

**Mitigation**
To reduce your exposure you should:
• Research your proposed destination before you book, such as by regularly checking the country travel advice and subscribing to the advice
• Ensure your itinerary does not include any areas where the travel advisory advises against travel; this may also include border areas or other locations within an otherwise low-risk country:
  − Consider if you need to be travelling to areas assessed as ‘Reconsider your need to travel’ or if you persist, take additional precautions
  − Be aware that if the travel advice level changes after you have booked, but before you have departed, you may be able to make a claim on your travel insurance policy
  − Be prepared to postpone or cancel activities for safety reasons
• Monitor the news in the country and region you plan to visit to identify any issues that might affect your safety, including knowing about symbolic days or political events to avoid
• Be vigilant in public areas and places that attract

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foreigners and Westerners, such as embassies, hotels, restaurants, bars, nightclubs and identifiably Western interests:

- Avoid areas with poor security
- Identify emergency exits and have an action plan in the event of a security threat
- Have a telephone and emergency contact information with you at all times
- In high threat locations consider obtaining professional security advice and ensure that you adhere to strict security procedures, which may include:
- Avoiding routines that make you an easy target – vary the time and route of your regular journeys
- Considering ways of minimising your profile
- Undertaking formal risk assessments.

**Attacks harming Australians**

Since 2001, over 100 Australians have been killed in terrorist attacks in public places. These attacks include:

- The attack in Tunis on the Bardo National Museum on 18 March 2015
- The attack in Nairobi on Westgate Mall in 2013
- The attacks in Jakarta on the Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels in 2009
- The attacks in Mumbai on the Taj and Trident Hotels in 2008
- Bali bombings of 2005
- The Jakarta Marriott bombing of 2003
- The Bali nightclub bombings of 2002

Over the past decade, Australians have also been kidnapped and held hostage by terrorists in Somalia, Syria, the southern Philippines and Burkina Faso. Substantial ransoms have been demanded for their release. The Australian Government’s longstanding policy is that it does not make payments or concessions to kidnappers. The Australian Government considers that paying a ransom increases the risk of further kidnappings, including of other Australians.

**Regional terrorism threat**

Terrorist attacks can happen anywhere in the world. The following information focuses on countries and risks most relevant to Australian travellers.

**South-East Asia**

- **Indonesia**: The 14 January 2016 attack in central Jakarta demonstrates that terrorists retain the intent to carry out deadly attacks. In the past, terrorists have launched a number of attacks against Indonesian security forces and locations frequented by foreigners such as nightclubs, restaurants, hotels and embassies. Major attacks have been carried out in Bali and Jakarta, killing a large number of foreigners, including many Australians. In recent years authorities have disrupted terrorist cells in Bali, Jakarta and elsewhere in Java, West Nusa Tenggara, Sumatra and South Sulawesi. We continue to receive information that indicates that terrorists may be planning attacks in Indonesia, which could take place anywhere at any time.
- **Philippines/Malaysia**: Since 2015, authorities have made a number of arrests of persons involved in attack planning in Malaysia. An ISIL-claimed attack on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur in June 2016 caused a number of injuries. Southern Philippines-based terrorist groups have the capability to launch attacks and kidnappings throughout the Philippines and in neighbouring parts of Malaysia. Since 2014, a number of foreign nationals have been kidnapped from these coastal locations, and some have been beheaded. The kidnapping risk in this area is highest in central and western Mindanao, the Zamboanga peninsula, the Sulu Sea and between Sandakan and Tawau in eastern Sabah (Malaysia).
- **Thailand**: A bomb attack at the Erawan shrine central Bangkok killed 20 people and injured over 120 in August 2015. There is also a long-standing terrorist threat centred in the southern provinces closest to Malaysia. Attacks by separatists have claimed the lives of more than 6,000 people in the past decade. For this reason we recommend against all travel to the provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla, or overland by train or road to and from the Malaysian border through these provinces, due to high levels of ongoing violence.

**South and West Asia**

- Attacks by terrorist groups across Afghanistan and Pakistan remain a regular occurrence, targeting both local government and Western interests. An attack in Lahore in March 2016 killed 70 people and injured hundreds more. Australians remain at high threat of kidnapping in all parts of Afghanistan and the parts of Pakistan closest to Afghanistan, including Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. A number of major attacks have been launched in recent years against hotels in Pakistan and Afghanistan that cater to Western visitors. Security arrangements for Australian Embassy staff in Kabul are at a high level at all times.
- Although less frequent, terrorist groups active in India have previously demonstrated the intent and capability to attack locations such as hotels, restaurants and public markets in major Indian cities where Westerners congregate. Since September 2015, a number of foreigners have been murdered and injured in Bangladesh in attacks that have been claimed by terrorists in Syria. For example, 18 foreigners were killed in an attack in Dhaka in July 2016. In this period, a number of other attacks have targeted the security forces and local civilians. There is reliable information to suggest that militants may be planning to target Australian and Western interests in Bangladesh.
**Middle East and North Africa**

- The ongoing civil war in Syria and emergence of terrorist safe havens has led to a profound destabilisation in the region, such as recent attacks in the border areas of Jordan. ISIL continues to hold territory in northern Syria and Iraq, prompting military action by a number of Western and regional governments including Australia. This has increased the likelihood of reprisal attacks by ISIL supporters across the world. Australians in Syria and Iraq, including Iraqi Kurdistan, remain at significant risk of terrorist attack and kidnapping. Westerners kidnapped in Syria have been executed for propaganda purposes. Australian businesses and NGOs should have robust security arrangements.

- A number of terrorist attacks have occurred in major cities in Turkey since October 2015. This includes three large suicide bombings in Ankara that killed a total of 175 people and two suicide bombings in a tourist area in Istanbul which killed 18 foreigners. An attack at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport killed 45 people and injured more than 200 in June 2016. We continue to receive information that indicates that terrorists may be planning attacks in Turkey which could take place at any time.

- The fragile security environment across Lebanon has deteriorated significantly as a result of the conflict in Syria. The spill over of violence has exacerbated tensions between Sunni and Shia groups including Hezbollah, and major attacks have occurred in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and areas near Syria. Travellers to Lebanon should monitor the travel advice closely as the level of advice changes frequently.

- Since November 2015, attacks on hotels in Bamako, Mali, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and at a resort near Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, killed more than 71 people, including a number of foreigners. Australian officials visiting these countries have adopted enhanced security procedures.

- In recent years, the security environment across North Africa and the Sahel region has deteriorated due to the activities of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali and neighbouring countries, the ongoing conflict in Libya and the situation in Iraq and Syria. AQIM has kidnapped a number of westerners from locations across the region and continues to threaten to attack western interests. Military intervention in Mali in 2012 by France and other countries against an AQIM safe haven has dispersed militants across the broader region, where they now pose a threat in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, and remote areas in the south of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Ongoing civil conflict in Libya and emerging ungoverned spaces has led to a number of attacks on Western interests and a string of kidnappings of westerners by groups associated with AQ and ISIL.

- Two terrorist attacks against locations frequented by foreigners in Tunisia in 2015 killed 60 people, mainly foreign tourists. We continue to receive information that indicates that terrorists may be planning attacks in Tunisia which could take place at any time. Further terrorist attacks are likely, including in tourist areas.

- There is a continuing threat of attack in Yemen and elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula from the activities of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The group has carried out a number of major attacks in Yemen, including on Western interests, and has been involved in numerous kidnappings of Westerners. The tempo of attacks in Saudi Arabia continues to be high.

**East and West Africa**

- The ongoing military operations in Somalia against the Al-Shabaab terrorist organisation has destabilised the security environment in the wider region. Somalia-based terrorists have threatened to attack the interests of East African Governments supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia. These governments include Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda. Major terrorist attacks linked to the situation in Somalia have occurred in Kampala (2010), Nairobi (2013), Djibouti (2014) and Garissa (2015). Al-Shabaab was responsible for an explosion on board an airliner departing Mogadishu airport in February 2016. Terrorist attacks have been disrupted in Ethiopia. The situation in Somalia has caused a decline in the security environment along the coast of Kenya and for mariners in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean. See our Piracy bulletin for details.

- In recent years the Boko Haram (BH) terrorist organisation has carried out a number of major attacks in the north of Nigeria as well as in Abuja, including on the UN building in 2010. Thousands of people have been killed. BH has kidnapped foreign nationals in Nigeria, as well as neighbouring countries, and has demanded significant ransoms for their release. BH has links to AQIM and AQ, and recently pledged allegiance to ISIL.

**Europe**

- We currently assess that a heightened risk of terrorist attack exists in a number of European countries, particularly in France and Belgium, where terrorist groups pose a threat to the French and Belgian Governments, as well as tourists. We continue to receive information that indicates that terrorists may be planning attacks in these countries which could take place at any time. Further terrorist attacks are likely, including in tourist areas.
countries due to the conflict in Syria and Iraq. In the past decade, major terrorist attacks have occurred in a number of European cities, such as Glasgow, London, Madrid, Moscow, Oslo, Volgograd, Paris, Brussels and Nice. Targets have included public transport and transport hubs as well as public places frequented by foreigners. European security services are taking robust measures in response to the current threat. An attack in July 2016 in Germany, involving a radicalised person attacking train commuters with an axe, underscores the ongoing risk of attacks by individuals and small groups.

Rest of the world
• Groups such as FARC and Shining Path have operated in Colombia and Peru for decades. The recent ceasefire negotiations between FARC and the Colombian Government may lead to a decrease in tensions, but attacks will still occur. Terrorist attacks occur regularly in Colombia, and we encourage travellers to read the travel advice for Colombia to understand the risks of travel.

Credible terrorist threats are reflected in the travel advice
If the Australian Government has any specific and credible information on terrorist attack planning, this will appear in the relevant country-specific advisory at smartraveller.gov.au. We encourage Australians who are planning to travel overseas to subscribe to this free service before travelling, so that you stay informed on the latest risks. Terrorist attacks may occur without warning and in areas where the risk of terrorist attack has not been previously highlighted.

Where to get additional information
Travellers can get additional information on the threat of international terrorism from:
• The Australian Government’s National Security website
• Reports produced by private analysts, think tanks and non-government organisations on security issues, such as the Lowy Institute and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
• Information on the terrorism threat published by the governments of the countries they intend to visit, such as the UK’s Terrorism and National Emergencies website and the US Homeland Security website
• The US State Department annual terrorism report for details of trends in terrorist attacks.

For business travellers
The Advice for Australian Business Travellers page provides tips on risks for Australian employers and individual business travellers to consider as part of their routine risk assessment process for short-term overseas travel for meetings and conferences, longer-term deployments overseas and travel to high-threat remote locations.

The ASIO Business Liaison Unit provides credible, intelligence-backed information on matters which may affect the security of Australian businesses in offshore locations.

For all travellers
Be a smart traveller. Before heading overseas:
• Organise comprehensive travel insurance and check what circumstances and activities are not covered by your policy
• Register your travel and contact details, so we can contact you in an emergency
• Subscribe to this travel advice to receive free email updates each time it’s reissued
• Follow us on Facebook and Twitter.
National Terrorism Threat Advisory System

Australia’s current National Terrorism Threat Level is ‘probable’, according to this fact sheet advice from the Australian Government

The National Terrorism Threat Advisory System is a scale of five levels to provide advice about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia:

When the threat level changes, the Australian Government provides advice on what the threat level means, where the threat is coming from, potential targets and how a terrorist act may be carried out.

The National Terrorism Threat Level is regularly reviewed in line with the security environment and intelligence.

It is important to be aware of the current threat level and to report any suspicious incidents to the National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00.

Public advice
The National Terrorism Threat Level for Australia is PROBABLE. Credible intelligence, assessed by our security agencies indicates that individuals or groups have developed both the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. The public should continue to exercise caution and report any suspicious incidents to the National Security Hotline by calling 1800 1234 00. Life-threatening situations should be reported to the police by calling Triple Zero (000).

We must maintain vigilance in the face of an escalating global terrorist threat that continues to affect Australia. This multifaceted threat was the reason the Commonwealth Government took the unprecedented step of raising the national terrorism threat level in September 2014. The factors that underpinned that decision persist, and some have worsened. Those who wish to do us harm, some located here and some overseas, continue to view Australia as a legitimate target.

Where does the threat come from?
A small number of people in Australia adhere to an interpretation of Islam that is selective, violent and extreme. They are influenced by extreme messaging from terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) who are active online spreading their violent ideology and channelling persuasive propaganda to susceptible, vulnerable and easily influenced individuals.

The radicalisation and recruitment of Australians is increasing. Violent extremists are reaching out to those willing to listen and encouraging them either to join ISIL or conduct attacks in its name. In some cases specific directions have been provided to conduct acts of terrorism here. Others, including those that are not in direct contact with violent extremists overseas, may be influenced by propaganda to undertake acts of terrorism in Australia. Those radicalised to violent extremism may display behavioural changes, develop new social networks and associations, withdraw from previous ones and promote an extremist ideology.

Recent large, coordinated terrorist attacks are concerning and the small number of Australia-based ISIL sympathisers and supporters might be emboldened by the perceived success of their overseas counterparts. Additionally, ISIL will glorify recent attacks, such as those in France and Mali and the attack on Metrojet Flight 9268, in propaganda to motivate and inspire their Western-based sympathisers and supporters. Elements of some of these recent attacks, such as the use of firearms and explosives as weapons, the capturing of hostages, and the focus on ‘soft’ targets, could be employed in an attack in Australia.

What are the likely targets?
Symbols of government and authorities perceived as terrorist adversaries, such as the military, police and security agencies, are often targeted by terrorists. However, indiscriminate attacks are increasing, and the risk to the general public in Australia remains.

Overseas extremists have encouraged local sympathisers and supporters to attack the public anywhere – attacks and plots in Europe and Africa in late 2015 targeting the public underscore this threat. Attacks of this nature are designed to cause injury or death and are aimed at disrupting our lives and damaging the nation by causing fear. This is why it is important for the public to maintain a level of awareness and to report any suspicious activity immediately to authorities.

How would an attack occur?
The most likely form for a terrorist attack on Australia is a level of awareness and to report any suspicious activity immediately to authorities.
attack in Australia would be an attack by an individual or a small group of like-minded individuals. However, a larger, more coordinated attack cannot be ruled out. Threats can develop quickly, moving to an act of violence with little preparation or planning.

It is highly likely that a terrorist attack in Australia would use weapons and tactics that are low-cost and relatively simple, including basic weapons, explosives and/or firearms. These are commonly used in terrorist attacks overseas and featured in the September 2014 attack on police officers in Melbourne, the December 2014 Martin Place siege in Sydney and the fatal shooting outside New South Wales Police headquarters in Parramatta in October 2015.

• Basic weapons are readily available, everyday objects that do not require specialist skills. Terrorists have used basic weapons such as knives, machetes and even cars to conduct lethal attacks.
• Explosives remain a favoured terrorist weapon globally. Homemade explosives can be manufactured from readily available materials. Improvised explosive devices do not need to be large to be effective and can be easily concealed.
• Firearms can be sourced through legal and illicit channels.

Our response
Federal, state and territory governments continue to focus on strengthening preventative efforts in partnership with industry and building Australia’s social cohesion, together with the community.

• Governments are working closely with communities to prevent terrorism, combat terrorist propaganda online and promote early intervention programmes.
• Federal, state and territory authorities have well-tested cooperative arrangements in place and have adopted appropriate security measures.
• Police and security agencies liaise closely with critical infrastructure owners and operators.

In the current environment, Australians should go about their daily business as usual but should exercise caution and be aware of events immediately around them.

If you see, hear or become aware of something suspicious or unusual, call the National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00. Every call is important and could prevent a terrorist attack in Australia.

Local advice
See the following websites for information specific to your state/territory:

• New South Wales – SecureNSW, https://direct.secure.nsw.gov.au
• Northern Territory – Northern Territory Government, https://nt.gov.au
• Queensland – Safeguarding Queensland, www.safeguarding.qld.gov.au
• South Australia – South Australia Police, www.police.sa.gov.au
• Tasmania – TasALERT, www.alert.tas.gov.au
• Western Australia – Western Australia Police, www.police.wa.gov.au

See the Frequently Asked Questions page for answers to some general questions about national security.

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SECURITY AND YOUR COMMUNITY: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

FAQs on the terrorism threat from the Australian National Security website

Is a terrorist attack likely in Australia?
Yes, we assess that a terrorist attack in Australia is PROBABLE. We know about a small number of individuals in Australia and abroad, who want to cause us harm. We know that some will or are being seduced by the extremist propaganda of ISIL. Unfortunately we fear some individuals will probably seek to undertake acts of terror here.

What does the threat level mean for me?
Unless government authorities tell you otherwise, there is no need to change how you go about your daily business. But it is a reminder of the environment we are now in and the threat we face. It is important to keep yourself aware of the advice on the current level of threat and keep up to date with advice from local authorities.

You should continue to exercise caution and report any suspicious incidents to the National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00 or in an emergency, call 000.

Is the threat level ever likely to go down?
The National Terrorism Threat Level is set from intelligence. If the level of threat is assessed as being lower, the Government will announce the change.

However, this is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Unfortunately we are now living in a heightened threat environment that is expected to last for some time.

What should we do if the threat level is raised again?
It’s important to remember that every situation is going to be unique.

If the level changes you will be provided with advice what the threat level means, where the threat is coming from, potential targets and the means by which a terrorist act may be perpetrated.

What is being done to protect Australia from terrorism?
Ensuring a safe and secure Australia is the first priority for all Australian governments.

A range of measures have been put in place to reduce the threat of terrorism in Australia but a significant threat remains.

Our security and law enforcement agencies are engaged in disruption efforts to prevent or mitigate against attacks but we have to be prepared for the fact that we might not detect all threats in time.

The Australian Government, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, together with our international partners are actively working to counter-terrorism domestically and internationally.

Australia’s current counter-terrorism capabilities are sophisticated and well tested.

The government has recently introduced new national security legislation.

Australia has a National Counter-Terrorism Plan in place. It details how Australian, state and territory governments and national security agencies will work together to detect, prevent and respond to terrorism.

Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy outlines the current terrorist threat that Australia is facing, and what our governments are doing to counter it. It focusses on five core elements: challenging violent extremist ideologies, stopping people from becoming terrorists, shaping the global environment to counter terrorism, disrupting terrorist activity within Australia and having effective responses and recovery should an attack occur.

A full list of national security agencies and their responsibilities is available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/WhatAustraliaisdoing/Pages/NationalSecurityAgencies.aspx

How will I be kept informed about Australia’s national security?
The Australian Government will keep all Australians informed about what is being done to protect Australia through public statements and this website. In an emergency situation, follow the instructions of authorities.

Any change to the National Terrorism Threat Level will be announced by the Australian Government based on advice from the Director-General of ASIO, with advice to the public about what it means for them.

Information on the current level, including public advice on the nature of the threat and what it means for all Australians is available on the National Terrorism Threat Advisory System page on the website.

Should I stay away from sporting and music events or change my domestic holiday plans?
There is no reason for any of us to stay away from public places or change our normal routines or domestic holiday plans. Australian governments work closely with police and event organisers across Australia so the community can enjoy themselves in a safe and secure environment.

It is essential that we do not allow the threat of terrorism to change the way of life we value so highly.

Is it safe to travel overseas? Are other countries experiencing an increased threat?
The situation in Syria and Iraq has increased global concern about terrorism, but this should not stop people from travelling for work or holidays where it is safe to do so.

For the latest international travel advice and to register your travel plans, go to the smartraveller.gov.au website.

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What is going to happen at airports? Is it safe to fly on a plane?
The current threat level means that you may continue to see increased security at airports and other transport hubs. Travellers should be mindful of this when making plans.

Am I going to see more physical security in my day to day life?
The current threat level means that in some places you might continue see a heightened level of security. These measures are designed to protect the public.

I have a small business. Where can I get more information?
More information about security and your business is available from the Information for business page which is available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Informationforbusiness/Pages/default.aspx

What can we do as a community?
This is an opportunity for us to live safe together as a community. All Australians have a role to play in making sure that Australia continues to be a safe place to live and visit. Visit the Living Safe Together website (www.livingsafetogether.gov.au) for more information about communities.

What if I know or see something and I want to tell authorities about it?
The Australian community is the most important partner for governments in countering terrorism. Members of the public can assist authorities to keep Australia safe by reporting suspicious behaviour or activity to the National Security Hotline on 1800 123 400. You can remain anonymous.

In an emergency you should call 000.

I work in the industry sector, is there anything I should do?
The Australian Government has published the National Guidelines for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism, including a guide of security measures to consider in relation to changes in the security situation, which should be used as a basis for your security plans.

If your organisation has been identified as critical infrastructure or a place of mass gathering in your state or territory, you should ensure that your security plans are up to date and that the counter-terrorism unit within your police service has your current contact details (including for after hours).

Organisations in the aviation, maritime and offshore oil and gas sectors regulated by the Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development will be provided with additional advice.

How likely is a chemical, biological or radiological attack by terrorists?
The current advice from official intelligence services is that the likelihood of this kind of terrorist attack in Australia is low.

Health authorities and emergency services have detailed plans in place to deal with such a situation and treat those affected.

In a chemical, biological or radiological incident, the most important thing to remember is to minimise your exposure, then watch your television or listen to your radio and wait for emergency services to tell you what to do. Stockpiles of antibiotics, vaccines, anti-viral drugs and chemical antidotes are in place.

The Australian Government Department of Health has health advice and more information about Australia’s preparations for health emergencies.

What can I do to protect myself and others at work?
Make sure you are familiar with the emergency and evacuation plans for your workplace. If you are unsure, ask your supervisor.

Attend an accredited first aid course.

If you run a business or manage a large building, review your security measures. You should also review your emergency and evacuation plans. Rehearse them, update if necessary, and make sure every member of your staff knows what to do.

Keep a careful check on garages and underground car parks so that you know whose vehicles are on your premises.

If you have security cameras, make sure they are working properly, check that the time and date are correct, and retain the recordings in case they might be of use to police in the future.

The National Guidelines for the Protection of Places of Mass Gatherings from Terrorism and Active Shooter Guidelines for Places of Mass Gathering are useful resources for owners and operators of places of mass gathering.

What if my children become concerned or anxious about terrorism?
Talk with your children about what is happening and what is being done to protect them. Encourage them to say how they feel.

Be honest about things being discussed in the media and in your community.

If anyone in your family becomes anxious to a point where it starts interfering with daily life, consult a health professional.

How many reports have been made to the National Security Hotline?
The National Security Hotline has received over 200,000 reports since it was established in December 2002. For monthly report numbers since July 2014, see the National Security Hotline statistics page on the website.

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Many Australians are fearful of a terrorist attack on home soil, however the reality is less alarming, writes Greg Austin

According to an ANUpoll, more than half of the country’s adults are concerned Australia will be a target for terrorism at home and strongly believe the government needs to introduce greater preventive measures to combat it. But the reality is less alarming.

More Australians have died at the hands of police (lawfully or unlawfully) in ten years (50 at least from 2006 to 2015) or from domestic violence in just two years (more than 318 in 2014 and 2015) than from terrorist attacks in Australia in the last 20 years.

Although Australia’s terrorism threat level is set at probable, the likelihood of an individual being killed or wounded from a terrorist attack in this country is extremely low. Terrorist attacks in Australia have claimed the lives of only three victims in the last two decades.

Australian fears are necessarily shaped by memories of the 2002 Bali terrorist attacks in which 202 people, many of them Australian, were killed. Since Bali, terrorist attacks overseas have claimed the lives of more than 110 Australians.

Even taking the overseas deaths into account, Australians can afford to feel more secure at home. Police say they were able to successfully foil 11 terrorist plots and four terror attacks against the Australian public in the last two years. Australian security services, supported by the public and community groups, have been very successful in monitoring the threats. According to the government’s 2015 review, the number of people in the country who have been prepared to commit terrorist acts here remains low.

The review found there had only been two terrorist attacks on Australian soil since 2001. NSW police accountant Curtis Cheng was killed by a teenager allegedly vowing allegiance to Islamic State in 2015.

Mother-of-three Katrina Dawson and Lindt cafe manager Tori Johnson were killed in the Martin Place siege in December 2014.

The most serious terrorist plot in Australian history dates back to 2005, more than a decade ago, referred to most commonly as Operation Pendennis, the name of the joint police and ASIO operation that prevented any attacks.

According to an academic study, 22 men were charged with terrorism offences for planning or helping co-ordinate attacks in Melbourne and Sydney. Of these, 18 were finally convicted. The success by our security services in thwarting these attacks may have deterred similar plots.

As my grandchildren left our hotel on Bastille Day in France this year for the fireworks, there was no denying I felt some concern about a possible terrorist attack. Luckily, the kids went to the Eiffel Tower, and not to the Promenade des Anglais in Nice where 84 people were killed and more than 100 injured.

I remain concerned about such attacks but am not afraid enough to consider preventing loved ones from travelling in Western countries.

Respondents to the 2016 ANUpoll may have felt more fearful of an attack than usual because of the public debate that was circulating at the time. The poll was conducted during and just after the last federal election, in which Pauline Hanson was propagandising a link between all Muslims and terrorism.

The ANUpoll was also conducted during the coroner’s inquest into the Lindt Cafe siege, and just after the Orlando massacre in June. It also closely followed the prime minister’s invitation of Muslim leaders to Kirribilli House, where Malcolm Turnbull mentioned the connection between the Muslim community and defence against terrorism.

Terrorist attacks in Australia have claimed the lives of only three victims in the last two decades.
Public opinion in Australia has an exaggerated view of the terrorist threat inside the country. As early as 2006, two Australian scholars put forward a “thought contagion theory” to explain this phenomenon. It suggests misleading ideas become commonly held beliefs after they are conveyed to many people.

The anxiety is often unnecessarily fuelled by politicians and journalists. One striking example was a warning from The Australian’s Greg Sheridan in November 2015 that the Paris attacks can be viewed as part of a series of threats that may lead to the end of Western civilisation.

But the over-anxiety about terrorist attacks in Australia conforms to a more longstanding phenomenon of Australian insecurity and exaggeration of international threats in almost all quarters. It also comes from the exaggerated fear of becoming a victim of domestic crime.

In this environment of supercharged public anxiety about terrorist threats on Australian soil, opinion leaders in politics, the media and academia have a responsibility to not inflame them. The ANUpoll might have framed some additional questions to speak to the excellent record of the security services at home and the relative safety they provide.

Greg Austin is Professor, Australian Centre for Cyber Security, UNSW, Australia.

**Australians want tougher action against terrorism**

The ANUpoll, ‘Attitudes to National Security: Balancing Safety and Privacy’, has found Australians believe the government could do more to prevent a terrorist attack in Australia, but also have concerns that Muslims are being singled out for increased surveillance and monitoring.

The poll found a significant majority (71%) are concerned about the possible rise of Islamist extremism in Australia, but 70% also believe Muslims in Australia should not be subject to additional scrutiny based on their religion. The Australian National University poll found strong support for the federal government’s strict border protection controls, retention of telecommunications metadata, revoking citizenship for foreign fighters with dual nationalities, and for bans on Australians travelling to conflict areas. However, a majority (55%) were not concerned about being a victim or having a family member as a victim of a future terrorist attack in Australia, while 45% were concerned.

**Key findings**

- 56% of poll respondents believe the government could do more to prevent terrorist attacks; 36% believe the government is doing all it can; 8% believe the government has done too much
- 67% support retention of communications metadata
- 59% believe counter-terrorism policies single out Muslims for surveillance and monitoring, and 46% of those say they are bothered by that
- 80% approve or strongly approve current border control measures as needed to protect Australia from extremism and terrorism
- 69% say Australia should prevent citizens from participating as fighters in overseas conflicts
- 85% support removing citizenship from dual nationals involved in terrorist activities overseas; but most support the courts having the power to remove citizenship rather than the Immigration Minister
- 71% are either concerned or very concerned about the possible rise of Islamic extremism in Australia, with personal concerns easing as education levels rise
- 70% believe Muslims in Australia should not be subject to additional scrutiny due to their religion.

The ANUpoll is a result of a national random telephone survey of 1,200 people interviewed between late June and early July 2016.

Source: Australian National University, Australians want tougher action against terrorism – ANUpoll (Media release, 10 October 2016), www.anu.edu.au

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COUNTERING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

15

Greg Austin is Professor, Australian Centre for Cyber Security, UNSW, Australia.

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CHAPTER 2
Counter-terrorism laws and strategies

Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: strengthening our resilience

Executive summary from a report by the Council of Australian Governments

In September 2014, for the first time, Australia’s National Terrorism Public Alert level was raised to High. This reflected the judgement of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) that a terrorist attack was likely. The heightened threat level is likely to endure.

Australian governments are proactively dealing with the threat. We are working with our international partners and with the Australian community to lower the risk of a terrorist attack and strengthen our ability to respond to, and recover from, any attack.

The purpose of releasing this Strategy is to provide information to the community on the threat Australia faces and what we are doing to counter it. Importantly, it highlights the community’s role in preventing, preparing for, responding to and recovering from a terrorist attack.

This Strategy sets out the framework for Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements. It situates the current terrorism threat within the global context and articulates how we are countering it. It sits above and is complemented by the National Counter-Terrorism Plan; an important resource that outlines governance and jurisdictional arrangements and operational responsibilities for preventing, preparing, responding to and recovering from domestic terrorist attacks.

Our Strategy is based on the following principles:

• Protecting lives is the absolute priority
• Governments and the community must face the challenge of terrorism together
• Terrorist acts are crimes to be dealt with through the criminal justice system.

Terrorism and Australia

Globally, ISIL, AQ and associated groups represent the most significant terrorist threat.

These groups are motivated by a selective, violent and extreme interpretation of Islam. Such an interpretation is alien to the overwhelming majority of Muslims.

Though ISIL is the most threatening manifestation of this terrorist threat, AQ and some associated groups retain the intent and capability to mount major attacks. ISIL, in particular, exerts a direct influence in Australia through its aggressive promotion of violent extremism. This group’s violent ideology, persuasive propaganda, and its grooming of young people online is directly responsible for the radicalisation to violent extremism of a significant number of individuals in our community. As a direct flow-on result, there is now a higher risk of attacks by individuals or by small groups than ever before.

Violent extremist influences in Australia will be exacerbated by foreign fighters seeking to return from conflict zones in the Middle East. Some of these foreign fighters will seek to return with the skills, experience and a predisposition to violent action that will make them a significant risk to the community.

Terrorism based on other ideological, religious, or political beliefs – such as right wing or left wing extremists – is also of concern, though it does not represent the same magnitude of threat as that posed by violent extremists claiming to act in the name of Islam.

Resilience of the Australian community

The Australian community’s resilience is important to everything we do to counter terrorism. Building and maintaining our resilience allows us to push back against...
terrorists’ attempts to intimidate us and undermine social cohesion.

**Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy is based on partnerships between all levels of government, communities and the private sector. It is focussed on prevention as a first line of defence against terrorism. Our actions are informed by thorough analysis and assessments of violent extremism here and abroad.

This Strategy involves five core elements.

1. **Challenging violent extremist ideologies**

   Australia’s task to constrain the terrorist threat is fundamentally about limiting the spread and influence of violent extremist ideas.

   Governments are working with communities to counter violent extremist propaganda with carefully targeted messages. Our messages show people there are ways they can help improve the situation in Syria or Iraq, and ways they can find a sense of meaning and belonging in Australia, without resorting to violence.

   Importantly, the information we provide shows the horror of living, killing and dying in the conflict zones, including exposing the horrific toll on local, overwhelmingly Muslim, populations.

   We also seek to promote the values and ideas which underpin our society, ideas such as equality, respect, individual freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.

   The exact messages conveying these themes are best developed and delivered by communities for their own members, though governments can help to facilitate them.

2. **Stopping people from becoming terrorists**

   The most effective defence against terrorism is to prevent people from becoming terrorists in the first place.

   To do this we work closely with the community: families, friends and community members are often in the best position to identify individuals who are at risk of radicalisation and help steer them away from violent extremism.

   Our aim is to prevent extremists from exploiting vulnerable Australians and robbing them of their futures.

3. **Shaping the global environment**

   Our efforts to counter terrorism in Australia are complemented by coordinated international action to make the global environment less conducive to terrorism. Australia works with international partners, including through the United Nations, to challenge terrorism.

   We also engage with a wide number of partner countries to build capacity and capability, undertake joint operations, and exchange information to assist partner governments in detecting, monitoring and responding to terrorism.

   Australia may also contribute to international military efforts to destroy or degrade major terrorist capabilities. Over the last decade, elements of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have been deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq for this purpose.

4. **Disrupting terrorist activity within Australia**

   Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are well-equipped to disrupt terrorist activity. They have a good history of disrupting numerous terrorist plots. Low-capability and limited-preparation attacks such as knife attacks present a challenge to police and intelligence agencies because they involve little or no lead time, making them difficult to detect. Given the absolute focus on saving lives, agencies will prioritise early disruption of a planned attack over waiting to gather further evidence for a successful prosecution.

   Early disruption is also used to stop activities that support or facilitate terrorism, but which may fall short of specific attack planning. There are a range of methods that can be used to send a message to individuals that their activities have attracted the...
Countering violent extremism

A statement from the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department

The Australian Government is committed to preventing violent extremism – that is, the use or support of violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. Countering violent extremism is a shared effort between all Australian governments. The objective of the countering violent extremism programme is to combat the threat posed by home-grown terrorism and to discourage Australians from travelling overseas to participate in conflicts. The Attorney-General’s Department coordinates this comprehensive national approach.

Australian governments and communities work together to build resistance to all forms of violent extremism, whether politically, religiously or racially motivated. Every day, federal, state and territory government agencies are engaging with communities and forming vital partnerships. The Australian Government’s approach comprises four complementary streams of activity.

Attention of authorities in an attempt to dissuade them from further action.

5. Effective response and recovery
If an attack does occur, we have robust arrangements in place to respond to any act of terrorism, from low-preparation to coordinated multi-jurisdiction mass-casualty attacks.

States and territories lead the response to any attacks within their jurisdictions. They can request assistance from other states, territories or the Commonwealth as required. States and territories may also ask for the
What Australia is doing: current initiatives

National Counter-Terrorism Plan
The National Counter-Terrorism Plan is maintained by the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee. It is the primary public document on Australia’s national counter-terrorism policy and arrangements. It outlines the responsibilities, authorities and the mechanisms to prevent acts of terrorism within Australia and to manage the consequences if they do occur. Visit the Publications page (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Pages/default.aspx) to download a copy.

Countering violent extremism
The Australian Government is working with communities to build resilience to violent extremism — that is, the use or support of violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. Visit the Living Safe Together website (www.livingsafetogether.gov.au) for more information.

Cyber security
Cyber security is one of the Australian Government’s highest national security priorities. CERT Australia is the single point of contact for cyber security issues affecting major Australian businesses. The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD, formerly DSD) provides foreign signals intelligence to the Australian Defence Force and Australian Government to support military and strategic decision-making.

The government launched its Cyber Security Strategy in 2009 with the aim to promote a secure, resilient and trusted electronic operating environment that supports Australia’s national security and maximises the benefits of the digital economy. To find out more about cyber security policy and read a copy of the strategy, visit the Attorney-General’s Department website (www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/CyberSecurity/Pages/default.aspx).

Data retention
The Australian Government is committed to providing our law enforcement and security agencies with the tools they need to keep our community safe by requiring the telecommunications industry to retain a limited set of metadata for two years. Find out more on the Attorney-General’s Department website (www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/CyberSecurity/Pages/default.aspx).

Transport and critical infrastructure
Transport systems continue to be attractive targets for terrorists seeking to inflict mass casualties, economic damage, instil fear and create spectacular media imagery. The Australian Government regulates preventive security planning in the aviation, maritime, air cargo supply chain and offshore oil and gas transport sectors. In addition, the government ensures that aviation and maritime transport security activities are carried out in accordance with Australia’s international obligations. Visit the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development website (https://infrastructure.gov.au/security) for more information.

The Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for Critical Infrastructure Resilience website provides an environment where business and government can share vital information on security issues relevant to the protection of Australia’s critical infrastructure — power, water, health, communication systems and banking — and the continuity of these essential services in the event of disasters. Visit the TISN website (www.tisn.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx) for more information.

Governance and accountability
Countering terrorism is a responsibility shared by all Australian governments, the community and the private sector.

The dynamic nature of the terrorist threat, and the rapid growth of home-grown and lone actor elements, demands rigorous monitoring and assessment to ensure our arrangements remain properly targeted and implemented. To this end, Australia’s national counter-terrorism coordinating body, the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), meets regularly to monitor and assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism arrangements. The ANACTC reports to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) annually.

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National security agencies

Australia’s response to terrorism relies on strong and cooperative relationships between the federal government and the states and territories, according to the Australian National Security website.

Our national security agencies have well-defined responsibilities and the authority to detect, prevent and respond to acts of terrorism in Australia. Terrorist incidents involving Australian interests outside Australia are in the first instance dealt with by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The roles and responsibilities of Australia’s national security agencies and authorities are listed below.

The Australian Government:
- Maintains counter-terrorism capabilities and national coordination arrangements within its agencies (listed below)
- Maintains national policies, legislation and plans
- Determines Australian Government prevention strategies and operational responses to threats
- Supports the states and territories in responding to terrorist situations in their jurisdictions
- Can, where the nature of the incident warrants it and with the agreement of the affected states and territories, declare a national terrorist situation. In such a situation the Australian Government would determine policies and broad strategies in close consultation with affected states or territories.

The Prime Minister takes the lead role in Australian Government counter-terrorism policy coordination.

The Attorney-General, supported by the National Security Committee of Cabinet and other ministers, is responsible for operational coordination on national security issues.

The Attorney-General’s Department coordinates national security and crisis management arrangements and provides legislative advice.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is Australia’s national security intelligence service. Its main role is to gather information and produce intelligence so that it can warn the government about activities or situations that might endanger Australia’s national security.

The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service manages the security and integrity of Australia’s borders. It works closely with other government and international agencies to detect and deter unlawful movement of goods and people across the border.

The Australian Defence Force maintains capabilities that can assist civil authorities in emergencies.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) investigates national terrorist offences, provides overseas liaison and protective services and performs a state policing function in the ACT. The AFP Protective Service provides physical protection services in relation to foreign embassies and certain government facilities, and also counter-terrorism first response at major airports.

The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) is Australia’s overseas secret intelligence collection agency. Its primary goal is to obtain and distribute secret intelligence about the capabilities, intentions and activities of individuals or organisations outside Australia, which may impact on Australia’s interests and the wellbeing of Australian citizens.

Border Protection Command provides security for Australia’s offshore maritime areas. Combining the resources and expertise of the Australian Customs Service and the Department of Defence, and working with officers from the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, and other Australian, state and territory agencies, it delivers a coordinated national approach to Australia’s offshore maritime security.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) aims to advance the interests of Australia and Australians internationally. It works with Australia’s allies and partners to confront terrorism and to enhance international counter-terrorism cooperation. It provides advice about specific security threats abroad for people travelling overseas and provides consular services to Australians living abroad. It also provides information in relation to the protection of foreign dignitaries.

The Department of Health leads a whole-of-government approach to strengthening Australia’s readiness for disease threats, national health emergencies and other large-scale health incidents.

The Department of Immigration and Border Protection maintains the Movement Alert List and enforces Australia’s visa regime. It is also actively engaged in a number of international data-accessing initiatives aimed at preventing the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups and has responsibility for border control.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet coordinates Australian Government counter-terrorism policy in collaboration with intelligence agencies and the states and territories. It also provides the secretariat for the Secretaries Committee on National Security and the National Security Committee of Cabinet. It co-chairs and provides the secretariat for the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) and advises the Prime Minister on matters related to counter-terrorism.

The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development regulates the security of airports, airlines, sea ports and other forms of transport, with state and territory authorities.

The Office of National Assessments assesses and analyses international political, strategic and economic developments for the Prime Minister and senior ministers in the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

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Australian national security: what I can do

Report suspicious behaviour and know what to do in an emergency, advises the Australian Government in this national security fact sheet

REPORT SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR

Small pieces of information from members of the public can help keep Australia safe from terrorism. Police and security agencies are working hard but you could help them complete the picture. If you see anything suspicious call the 24-hour National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00. Trained operators take every call seriously and you can remain anonymous.

Some things to look out for

Terrorists rely on surprise, so we cannot predict every possible situation. However, local and overseas experience has given us some possible warning signs to look out for.

Unusual videotaping or photography of official buildings or other critical infrastructure

Videotaping is one of the ways terrorists gather information about a target. In 2001, a major terrorist plot in Singapore was averted when videotapes of buildings to be attacked, including the Australian High Commission, were discovered.

Suspicious vehicles near significant buildings or in busy public places

Terrorists use vehicles for many different purposes, from surveillance to planting bombs, as in Bali in 2002. Vehicles may be parked for an unusually long time, sometimes in no-parking areas. Explosives can be heavy, so cars and vans may sit abnormally low on their suspension. They may be out of registration, or have false or missing number plates. Overseas, a terrorist attack was foiled after police became suspicious of a car with front and rear number plates that didn’t match.

Suspicious accommodation needs

The way terrorists use, rent and buy accommodation is often suspicious. In the UK, a rented garage was turned into a bomb factory. A member of the public reported strange comings and goings of men wearing gloves, which led to the arrest of terrorists who had already attacked Heathrow Airport three times.

Unusual purchases of large quantities of fertiliser, chemicals or explosives

Fertiliser is a widely available product that has been used in many terrorist bombs. In 1995 a bomb in Oklahoma City killed 168 people. One of the people involved was arrested following the discovery of a receipt for nearly a tonne of fertiliser that was used to make the bomb.

A lifestyle that doesn’t add up

While planning an attack, terrorists may lead lives that appear unusual or suspicious. Before the 11 September 2001 attacks, terrorists in the US undertook flight training but weren’t interested in learning how to take off or land. The leader of that group also paid cash for many large purchases such as the flight training, accommodation, vehicles and air tickets.

False or multiple identities

Terrorists frequently use stolen or fake documents, including passports and driver’s licences. They can also have several identities and may give conflicting details to those they come into contact with. Overseas, alert bank employees noticed a series of unusual transactions and identified an account that had been opened in a false name. They reported it to authorities, who uncovered links to a terrorist group.

Unattended bags

If you see an unattended package or bag in a public place, with no apparent reason for it being there, here’s what to do:

a. Ask if anyone owns it
b. If no one does, don’t touch it
c. Alert others to keep away
d. If in a shopping mall or building, contact security
e. Or call local police or the National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00.

KNOW WHAT TO DO IN AN EMERGENCY

Be prepared

Preparing for terrorism should be approached like any emergency such as fire or flooding. This is known as the ‘all hazards’ approach. A few basic, common sense measures are outlined below, which you may wish to put in place.

Develop an emergency plan

Decide who in your household will do what in an emergency and make sure everyone knows his or her role. For example, who will check on elderly neighbours or pick up children from school?

Ask someone to be your key contact

Choose an out-of-town friend or relative who is prepared to be a point of contact if the members of your household are separated in an emergency. Make sure everyone (including your key contact) has a full list of your contact details.

Agree on a meeting place

Decide where your group will meet in the event of an incident that makes it impossible for you to go home.

Know your home

In some emergencies you may need to turn off your electricity, water or gas. Make a note of where the main switches and valves are located.

Find out about your local emergency services

Record the numbers of your local police, fire, ambulance and council,
and your State Emergency Service, together with gas and electricity suppliers.

**Assemble an emergency kit**
Prepare an emergency kit and keep it where you can find it easily. It should include a torch, a battery-operated radio, a first aid kit including disposable latex gloves, and copies of your important personal documents.

**During an emergency**
Following is some general emergency advice and information on what to do in specific situations.

**General advice**
- Try to remain calm and reassure others.
- Check for injuries. Attend to your own injuries first so you are then able to help others.
- Ensure your family and neighbours are safe – especially children, the elderly or those who are living alone.
- Watch your television or listen to your radio for information.
- Follow the advice of the emergency services. If it is dark, check for damage using a torch. Do not light a match – there could be gas in the air.
- If you smell gas, turn off the main gas valve if it is safe to do so, and quickly move everyone outside.
- Call to let someone know you are safe but minimise other calls unless the situation is life-threatening, to avoid overloading phone lines.
- Use a landline to call essential contacts if mobile networks are down.
- Make sure pets are safe and have food and water.

**If a bomb explodes**
- Protect yourself from falling debris.
- Get away to an open space or protected area as quickly and calmly as possible.
- Stay away from tall buildings, glass windows and parked vehicles.
- Follow the instructions of the emergency services.
- If you have any information that may help apprehend suspects or identify a vehicle involved, contact the police or the National Security Hotline at once.

**If you receive a suspicious package**
- Do not open it.
- Leave it alone and immediately clear the area.
- Call 000 and ask for the police. Wait in a safe place until emergency services arrive, and follow their instructions.

**If you are caught in a fire**
- Stay low to the floor, as smoke and heat rises.
- Use the emergency exit to get out of the building as quickly and safely as possible – do not use the lift.
- Check doors before opening them – if they feel hot there may be fire on the other side.

**A chemical, biological or radiological incident**
- In a chemical, biological or radiological incident, the most important things to remember are to minimise your exposure, then watch your television or listen to your radio and wait for emergency services to tell you what to do.
- It is not possible to give specific instructions for all chemical, biological or radiological incidents as what to do will depend on what agent has been released.
- If there is a public alert about an incident, authorities may tell you to stay inside, close all doors and windows and turn off air conditioners. Alternatively, you may be told to evacuate the area. Follow the advice of emergency services.
- Current advice from official intelligence services is that the likelihood of a chemical, biological or radiological terrorist attack in Australia is low.
- Health authorities and emergency services have detailed plans in place to deal with a situation and treat those affected.
- Stockpiles of antibiotics, vaccines, anti-viral drugs and chemical antidotes are in place.

For more information on what to do in an emergency, visit the Frequently Asked Questions page of the website.

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AUSTRALIA’S COUNTER-TERRORISM LAWS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

This pamphlet information explains the latest counter-terrorism laws and is reproduced courtesy of the Attorney-General’s Department

TERRORIST ACT OFFENCES AND HOW THEY APPLY

Australia’s terrorist act offences are contained in the Criminal Code Act 1995.

What is a terrorist act?

A ‘terrorist act’ is an act, or a threat to commit an act, that is done with the intention to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause, and the act causes:

- Death, serious harm or endangers a person
- Serious damage to property
- A serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or
- Seriously interferes with, disrupts or destroys critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network.

A terrorist act does not cover engaging in advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action where a person does not have the intention to urge force or violence or cause harm to others.

If found guilty of committing a terrorist act, a person could face up to life imprisonment.

What is a terrorist act offence?

The terrorist act offences mean it is an offence to:

- Commit a terrorist act
- Plan or prepare for a terrorist act
- Finance terrorism or a terrorist
- Provide or receive training connected with terrorist acts
- Possess things connected with terrorist acts, or
- Collect or make documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts.

A person may be convicted of a terrorist act offence if the person intends to commit one of these offences or if the person was reckless as to whether his or her actions would amount to a terrorist act.

For example, a person may be found guilty of a terrorist act offence where the person intentionally prepared or planned the commission of a terrorist act but did not actually commit the terrorist act themselves.

A person may still commit a terrorist act offence even though a terrorist act did not occur.

What does it mean to have an intention to do something or to be reckless about something?

A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that conduct. A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists or will exist. A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.

A person is reckless with respect to a result or a circumstance if the person is aware of a substantial risk that the result or circumstance will exist and having regard to the circumstances known to the person, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.

TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AND RELATED OFFENCES

Australia’s terrorist organisation offences are contained in the Criminal Code Act 1995.

What is a terrorist organisation?

A terrorist organisation is an organisation that:

- A court finds is either directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, or
- An organisation that has been listed by the Government.

When can the Government list a terrorist organisation?

The Government can list an organisation as a terrorist organisation if it advocates terrorism or engages in preparing, planning, assisting or fostering the doing of a terrorist act.

An organisation advocates terrorism if it directly or indirectly:

- Counsels or urges the doing of a terrorist act
- Provides instruction on the doing of a terrorist act, or
- Directly praises the doing of a terrorist act, where there is a substantial risk that this praise might lead a person to engage in a terrorist act.

Before an organisation can be listed, the Attorney-General must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act.

When the Government decides to list an organisation as a terrorist organisation, that decision is publicly reviewed by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on intelligence and security. Any person who wishes to
raise any issues with the decision to list an organisation may submit their objections or concerns to the Parliamentary Joint Committee. More information on the Parliamentary Joint Committee’s reviews of the listing of organisations can be found at www.aph.gov.au under Committees.

The listing of an organisation ceases to have effect three years after its commencement, or if the Attorney-General ceases to be satisfied that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, whichever occurs first.

Terrorist organisations listed in Australia can be found on the National Security website at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au under Terrorist organisations.

What offences apply in relation to terrorist organisations?

It is an offence to:

- Be a member of
- Direct the activities of
- Recruit for
- Train or receive training from
- Acquire funds for, from or to, or
- Provide support to a terrorist organisation.

Providing support to a terrorist organisation means any support or resources that are intentionally provided to help the organisation prepare, plan, assist in or foster the doing of a terrorist act.

It is also an offence to associate with a listed terrorist organisation. Associating with a listed terrorist organisation is prohibited where the association occurs two or more times, the association provides support to the organisation and the person intends that the support assists the listed organisation to expand or to continue to exist.

However, a person would not commit the association offence if he or she is associating with a close family member for the purposes of a family or domestic matter and importantly, a person’s cultural background will be taken into account in determining whether something is a family or domestic matter.

There are also exemptions from the association offence if the association occurs during the course of religious worship in a public place, such as a mosque or church.

To be found guilty of these offences, a person must either have known the relevant organisation was a terrorist organisation, or have been reckless as to whether it was a terrorist organisation.

However, in order to commit the offence of being a member of a terrorist organisation, the person must know they are a member of a terrorist organisation.

If a person is found guilty of associating with a terrorist organisation, the maximum penalty is three years imprisonment or if a person is found guilty of being a member of a terrorist organisation, the maximum penalty is 10 years imprisonment. If found guilty of one of the other terrorist organisation offences, a person may be imprisoned for up to 25 years.

Can a person commit a terrorist organisation offence where the organisation has not been listed by the Government?

A person may commit a terrorist organisation offence even if the Government has not listed the organisation as long as that organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act.

In prosecuting the terrorist organisation offence, the prosecution would need to prove beyond reasonable doubt to a court that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in terrorism. In addition, the prosecution would have to prove that the person either knows that the organisation is a terrorist organisation or is aware there is a substantial risk that the organisation is involved in terrorist activity.

PREVENTATIVE DETENTION AND WHEN IT APPLIES

When can the police preventively detain a person?

The police can detain people under preventative detention orders only where there is a threat of an imminent terrorist attack or immediately after a terrorist attack has occurred.

Individuals can be detained if it is necessary to prevent an imminent terrorist act or if it is likely vital evidence in the aftermath of a terrorist act will be lost.

Under Commonwealth law, the maximum amount of time a person can be preventatively detained is 48 hours. Under state and territory laws, a person can be detained for up to 14 days. Importantly, even when a combination of the Commonwealth and state or territory preventative detention regimes are applied, the maximum time a person can be preventatively detained is 14 days.

A person detained under a preventative detention order has the right:

- To be treated humanely and not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
- To contact a lawyer
- To contact family members and employers to let them know they are safe
- To not be questioned
- To have a copy of the preventative detention order, which contains a summary of the reasons for making the order
- To an interpreter if they have difficulty with English.

Children under 16 years of age cannot be detained. A person that is at least 16 years of age but under 18 can be detained but must be detained separately from adults. They can also have a parent or guardian visit them while they are being detained.
INVESTIGATING A TERRORISM OFFENCE

If you or someone in your care is detained and/or questioned by the police, you will require more detailed advice than that provided in this pamphlet.

When and how can the police detain a person for questioning when investigating terrorism?
The Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 enables the police to arrest and detain a person for questioning where there are reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed a Commonwealth offence.

The police can question a person for an initial period of four hours (or two hours for persons who are or appear to be under 18 years, or are Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander), which can be extended with the approval of a judicial officer to a maximum of 12 hours, or, in the case of a terrorism offence, to a maximum of 24 hours.

The questioning time is able to be suspended to enable the person to rest, receive medical attention, speak to a lawyer or other representative or communicate with a friend, relative, interpreter or relevant consular officer if the person is not an Australian citizen.

In the case of a terrorism offence, a judicial officer may also approve additional periods of time where it is necessary for police to collect and analyse information from overseas authorities, operate between different time zones or translate material. During these additional periods of time, questioning must be suspended.

In addition to the requirement that any extension of the questioning period or additional detention for the purposes of investigation be approved by an independent judicial officer, there are a range of other safeguards in the legislation. These safeguards include the right for a suspect to have a lawyer present during questioning and the right to be treated with humanity and respect for human dignity.

What about questioning and detention by ASIO?
The Australia Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) can question, and in limited circumstances detain, people in order to gather information for preventing terrorist attacks.

ASIO must have a warrant issued by a federal judge or federal magistrate before it can use its questioning and detention powers.

A person can be detained for up to seven continuous days and they can be questioned for a maximum period of 24 hours, or 48 hours if they need an interpreter. Children under 16 years of age cannot be detained or questioned by ASIO.

A person who is questioned or detained by ASIO has the right:
• To be treated humanely and not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
• To have access to a lawyer

To make a complaint at any time about ASIO or the Australian Federal Police to the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security or the Commonwealth Ombudsman

To contact a parent or guardian if the person is 16 or 17 years of age and have their parent or guardian present during questioning.

Under an ASIO questioning and detention warrant a person is entitled to contact a lawyer for legal advice. A person who is the subject of an ASIO questioning, or questioning and detention, warrant:
• Must answer all questions permitted by the warrant
• Must surrender their passports
• Must not leave Australia without permission
• Must not tell others, while the warrant is on foot, that they are being questioned or detained by ASIO, unless they are permitted to do so
• Must not tell others, for a period of two years after the expiry of the warrant, about any operational information relating to the warrant, unless they are permitted to do so.

The penalty for not complying with these conditions is five years imprisonment.

It is important to understand that if a person has been questioned by ASIO they cannot talk about it.

If you or someone in your care is subject to questioning by ASIO, you will require more detailed advice than that provided in this pamphlet.

PREVENTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM

What does it mean to finance terrorism?
Financing terrorism involves the intentional collection or provision of funds (including on behalf of another person) and recklessness as to whether the funds will be used to facilitate or engage in a terrorist act.

It does not matter if a terrorist act does not occur, or if the funds will not be used for a specific terrorist act or for more than one terrorist act.

Can a person be convicted of financing terrorism if he or she donates to a charity?
If the person making the donation is aware there is a substantial risk that the donation will be used for terrorism purposes and it is unjustifiable to take that risk in the circumstances, that person could be convicted of financing terrorism.

What is being done in Australia to enforce laws preventing the financing of terrorism?
Australia has a special agency, the Australian Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), that monitors bank accounts and the movement of money. This means the chances of catching people involved in financing terrorism are high.

It is also possible to have bank accounts frozen in
**Foreign incursions and recruitment offences**

Fact sheet advice from the Attorney-General’s Department

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**On 1 December 2014 the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 was repealed and foreign incursions and recruitment offences were relocated to new Part 5.5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995.**

Under Part 5.5 of the Criminal Code, it is an offence to:

- Enter a foreign country with an intention to engage in a hostile activity, unless serving in or with the armed forces of the government of a foreign country
- Prepare to enter, or for another person to enter, a foreign country with an intention to engage in a hostile activity
- Recruit persons to join an organisation engaged in hostile activities, or to serve in or with an armed force in a foreign country.

The Attorney-General may permit recruitment of a person or class of persons to serve with an armed force of a foreign country if it is in the interests of the defence or international relations of Australia.

It is not an offence under Part 5.5 for an Australian to join the armed forces of a foreign country.

If a person is found guilty of entering or preparing to enter a foreign country to engage in a hostile activity, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. If a person is found guilty of recruiting a person to join an organisation engaged in hostile activities, the maximum penalty is 25 years imprisonment. The maximum penalty for the offence of recruiting persons to serve in or with an armed force of a foreign country is 10 years imprisonment.

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**Declared area offence**

It is an offence for a person to intentionally enter, or remain in, a declared area in a foreign country where the person is reckless to the fact that the area is a declared area. The maximum penalty for this offence is 10 years imprisonment.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs may declare an area in a foreign country if they are satisfied that a listed terrorist organisation is engaging in a hostile activity in that area. The Minister’s decision will be based on advice provided by Australian Government agencies in the form of a Statement of Reasons.

Whenever possible, the Statement of Reasons will be prepared as a stand-alone document, based on unclassified information about the hostile activity that a listed terrorist organisation is engaging in that area of the foreign country. This enables the Statement of Reasons to be made available to the public, and provides transparency as to the basis on which the Minister’s decision is made.


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**EXPLAINING CONTROL ORDERS**

**What is a control order?**

A person can be subject to a control order if it substantially assists in preventing a terrorist attack or if the person has trained with a listed terrorist organisation. Control orders must be issued by a court.

A control order can stop a person from:

- Being in certain areas or leaving Australia
- Communicating or associating with certain people
- Owning or using certain articles
- Carrying out certain activities, including work
- Accessing certain forms of technology, including the internet.

A control order can require a person to:

- Remain in premises between certain times of each day
- Wear a tracking device
- Report to someone at a certain time and place
- Allow themselves to be photographed.

A control order does not come into effect until the person subject to it is notified and must not last longer than 12 months.

A person can apply for a control order to be varied, revoked or declared void as soon as the person is notified that an order is confirmed.

In deciding whether to issue a control order, a court must consider the impact of each of the control order requirements upon the person’s circumstances, including their financial and personal circumstances.

A person subject to a control order and his or her lawyer are able to obtain a copy of the order which contains a summary of the grounds for the order.

A control order cannot apply to children under 16 years of age. For people aged at least 16 years but under 18 years, a control order can only apply for a maximum of three months. For people aged 18 years or over, a control order can last for up to 12 months.

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Australia has enacted a range of laws aimed at combatting the threat of terrorism. It is critically important that security agencies have appropriate powers to ensure national security, even where this impinges on individual rights and freedoms. However, such limitations must be clearly expressed, unambiguous in their terms and legitimate and proportionate responses to potential harms.

**KEY ISSUES**

Federal law provides for the operation of control orders, preventive detention orders and questioning and detention orders. Control orders may place significant prohibitions and restrictions on a person’s freedom of movement, expression, association and right to privacy. Preventive detention orders allow the detention of persons without criminal conviction or charge. Questioning and detention warrants allow for those who have not been suspected of any offence to be questioned and detained for the purposes of gathering intelligence about terrorism offences. These provisions can interfere with individual rights and freedoms.

In 2011 the Government created the office of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM). The INSLM has a statutory mandate to review the operation, effectiveness and implications of Australia’s counter-terrorism and national security laws on an ongoing basis. In his annual reports to parliament the first INSLM repeatedly recommended that government moderate aspects of counter-terrorism laws better safeguard rights and freedoms. Government has not yet responded to any of the INSLM’s reports nor has it adopted the INSLM’s recommendations to moderate counter-terrorism laws.\(^1\)

Over the past year, the government has enacted laws that make it an offence, punishable by imprisonment, for any person including a journalist, to report on matters that are defined under the act as a ‘special intelligence operation’.\(^2\) The laws further expand powers of security agencies to obtain information without warrant.

In early 2015 the Australian government introduced a mandatory data retention scheme. The scheme requires service providers to retain communications data for two years. This data would then be available to law enforcement agencies without a warrant in a broad range of circumstances. The Commission has expressed concern that the regime unjustifiably limits individual rights to privacy and freedom of expression.\(^3\)

**RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission recommends that Government ensure all counter-terrorism laws remain under constant review to ensure that any infringement of human rights is legitimate and proportionate.

**NOTES**

1. For example, in his 2012 report, the INSLM recommended that control order provisions be repealed. Rather than addressing this recommendation, in 2014, the government expanded the control order regime and weakened associated safeguards.

2. See further Australian Human Rights Commission Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence And Security Inquiry into the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 (21 August 2014), paras 54-63.


Australia’s Human Rights Score Card: Counter-Terrorism

This NGO Coalition fact sheet relating to Australia’s 2015 Universal Periodic Review was reproduced courtesy of the Human Rights Law Centre.

Since 2001, Australia has enacted over 60 counter-terrorism laws. These laws contain a wide range of criminal offences and grant broad investigative powers to the police and intelligence agencies. Many of these laws infringe upon fundamental human rights by restricting the rights to liberty, privacy, and the freedoms of speech, movement, and association.

**Offence of Entering or Remaining in a ‘Declared Area’**

In October 2014, the Abbott government passed the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth) (Foreign Fighters Act) in response to the threat of foreign fighters returning from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The Foreign Fighters Act introduced a new offence, punishable by 10 years’ imprisonment, of entering or remaining in a ‘declared area’. The Minister for Foreign Affairs may declare part of a foreign country as a declared area if he or she is satisfied that a terrorist organisation is engaged in a hostile activity in that area. This might include, for example, parts of Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Indonesia.

There are no other elements to this offence, such as an intention to engage in hostile activity. The person needs merely to enter or remain in the area. As a defence, the person may show that he or she travelled to the area solely for a legitimate purpose. There is a list of specified legitimate purposes, such as conducting official duties, visiting a family member or providing humanitarian aid. However, this list of defences is short and does not include a range of legitimate reasons why a person might travel to a foreign country in conflict (such as visiting a friend, or conducting business transactions). The government has not technically reversed the onus of proof, as the prosecution must still prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. However, the offence is framed in such a way that is has essentially the same effect. The offence clearly infringes the right to freedom of movement by prohibiting Australians from travelling to designated ‘no-go zones’.

**Proposed recommendation**

Australia should repeal the offence of entering or remaining in a declared area.

**Offence of Advocating Terrorism**

The Foreign Fighters Act also introduced a new offence of ‘advocating terrorism’. This offence will be made out where the person counsels, encourages, urges or...
promotes terrorism, and is reckless as to whether another person will engage in terrorism as a result.

While it should be (and is) a criminal offence to incite unlawful acts, this offence goes beyond the existing law of incitement. In doing so, it restricts the freedom of individuals to voice legitimate opinions on overseas conflicts. For example, the offence could apply to an individual who posted on a website that fighters opposing the Assad regime in Syria should engage in further attacks. In any conflict there will be difficult lines as to what acts are legitimate to encourage or promote, but clearly there should be scope in a free democratic society to adopt differing viewpoints on such difficult and divisive issues.

**Proposed recommendation**
Australia should repeal the offence of advocating terrorism.

### COUNTER-TERRORISM POWERS

Some of Australia’s most controversial counter-terrorism powers – namely control orders, preventative detention orders (PDOs), and a power that allows ASIO (Australia’s domestic intelligence agency) to question non-suspects while detaining them for up to a week – were due to expire under sunset clauses in late 2015 and early 2016. Through the *Foreign Fighters Act*, the Abbott government extended the operation of these powers until September 2018.

These powers allow the police and ASIO to place significant restrictions on an individual’s liberty without a finding of criminal guilt. They had been discredited in major inquiries by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), the COAG Counter-Terrorism Review and parliamentary committees, which recommended that the powers be repealed or substantially amended. For example, the COAG Counter-Terrorism Review remarked that powers such as PDOs “might be thought to be unacceptable in a liberal democracy”. In extending the operation of these powers, the government bypassed a major opportunity for their amendment or repeal.

Other new powers relating to the threat of terrorism – including a mandatory data retention regime – pose a significant risk to the privacy of Australian citizens. These laws should similarly be reviewed and amended in line with Australia’s international human rights obligations.

**Proposed recommendation**
Australia should review and amend its counter-terrorism powers – particularly control orders, PDOs, ASIO’s questioning and detention powers, and mandatory data retention – to ensure that they are consistent with the rights to liberty, privacy, and Australia’s other international human rights obligations.

### NOTES

4. As in other foreign incursions offences: see *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth), s 119.1.
8. This offence extends to the ‘promotion’ of violence, and because the person need only be reckless (rather than intend) that violence will occur: see eg, *R v Chonka* [2000] NSWCCA 466 [77].
16. *Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2014* (Cth). See also ASIO’s power to seek computer access warrants in *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979* (Cth), s 25A.

CITIZENSHIP IN AN AGE OF HOME-GROWN TERRORISM

AN EXTRACT FROM AN AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT BOOKLET ENTITLED 'AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP: YOUR RIGHT, YOUR RESPONSIBILITY'

The obligations of citizenship in an age of home-grown terrorism

Our success as a unified and cohesive nation created from a diversity of cultures, ethnicities and faiths could be challenged by a home-grown threat from people who reject our values and are prepared to resort to violence to impose ideological, political or social change.

The recent Counter-Terrorism Review concluded that Australia has entered a new, long-term era of heightened terrorism threat, with a much more significant 'home-grown' element. It assessed that the threat of terrorism in Australia is rising along with the number of known sympathisers and supporters of extremists. Thousands of young and vulnerable people in the community are susceptible to radicalisation.

The scale of involvement by Australian civilians in the conflict in Syria and Iraq far outstrips any previous conflict. There are at least 100 Australians fighting with or supporting terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. Australian security agencies are investigating close to 160 people in Australia who are actively supporting extremist and terrorist groups; the overwhelming majority of these people are young people. This includes a small number who have planned to conduct terrorist attacks here.

Last September, the Government raised the National Terrorist Threat Level to HIGH: our security agencies assess that a terrorist attack in Australia is likely. Since then, we have seen an attack in Melbourne and the Martin Place siege; other attacks have been disrupted. Twenty-three people have been arrested and charged as a result of counter-terrorism operations in the last eight months – one third of all terrorism-related arrests since 2001.

The Government is serious about countering home-grown terrorism. We are investing $1.3 billion in new counter-terrorism capabilities, and we have systematically updated our national security legislation to give our law enforcement and security agencies the powers they need to tackle the threat of home-grown terrorism.

Robust security and law enforcement efforts are essential. So too are stronger efforts to counter radicalisation in the community. We are developing new programmes to challenge terrorist propaganda and to provide an alternative narrative based on Australian values. All Australian governments are working with local communities to counter violent extremism.

As part of this overall strategy, we want to examine how we might build on existing citizenship laws to help deal with the terrorism threat.

Citizens who become involved in terrorism are rejecting Australia’s values and commitment to a safe and harmonious society. Support for, or involvement in, politically motivated violence is not acceptable to Australians. So it is reasonable to consider measures to act against those who betray the allegiance inherent in their citizenship of our nation.
Revocation of citizenship for dual nationals engaged in terrorism

Dual citizenship strengthens the social and economic fabric of our nation. The ability of Australian citizens to also be citizens of other countries gives people more freedom to move in an increasingly globalised world. It has strengthened our links with other nations, including in our region. Dual citizenship recognises there are Australians who have close connections to Australia and to another country as well.

However, Australian citizenship has never been unconditional. Since 1949, there have been provisions for the automatic loss of citizenship when a dual citizen serves in the armed forces of a country at war with Australia.

Arguably, Australians who engage in a serious act of terrorism do not deserve to remain Australian citizens. The United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France and many other European countries have powers to revoke citizenship on broad national security grounds. Canada has legislation which will come into force in the near future.

The Government intends to modernise the Australian Citizenship Act to enable the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to take action in the national interest to revoke the Australian citizenship of dual citizens who engage in terrorism that betrays their allegiance to Australia. These powers would be used against dual citizens who join or support listed terrorist groups such as Daesh, or engage in terrorist acts alone. They would apply to dual citizens who engage in terrorist activities here in Australia or on foreign soil, including that of our friends and allies.

The Government is also considering enabling the Minister to revoke Australian citizenship where there are reasonable grounds to believe the person is able to become a national of another country under their laws and would not be made stateless, as is the case in UK law. In the UK it is possible to revoke the citizenship of a person who has a legal right of access to the citizenship of another country, even if that right has not been exercised. Any new law would need to be consistent with our international legal obligations not to make a person stateless.

Measures to broaden the grounds for revocation, while very serious, should be proportionate given the severity of threats to national security. There would be safeguards — including judicial review — to ensure there are appropriate checks and balances on their operation.

- In what circumstances should a holder of Australian citizenship be regarded as having forfeited citizenship?
- Should the powers of revocation apply to citizens when the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is able to become a national of another country or territory under their laws and where it would not leave that person stateless?
- What limitations and safeguards should apply to laws enabling the revocation of the citizenship of Australians engaged in terrorism?

Suspension of privileges for Australian citizens engaged in terrorism

To ensure there are consequences for all Australians who engage in terrorism, not just dual citizens, should we consider additional powers like suspending certain privileges of citizenship? There are legal obligations that may limit the Government’s ability to suspend certain privileges.

There are already circumstances where some privileges of citizenship are suspended with broad community acceptance. For instance Australians serving prison sentences of more than three years have their voting rights suspended while they are imprisoned.

The Commonwealth Government is concerned that citizens who deliberately undermine our nation may have benefited from Government support. These people could be deemed to have abused the trust placed in them and the privileges they have gained through their citizenship. It was in this light that, in November 2014, the Australian Government legislated to allow for welfare payments to Australians to be cancelled on national security grounds.

Australian citizenship has to mean something. When citizens conduct themselves in ways at odds with their allegiance to Australia, a line has to be drawn.

Privileges of citizenship are fundamentally linked to an ongoing commitment to Australia and participation in Australian society. If citizenship is the contract by which we all abide, at what point is it broken and what should be the consequences when it is?

- Should certain privileges of citizenship — such as the right to vote in elections and receive consular assistance — be able to be suspended for Australian citizens engaged in terrorism?
- If so, which privileges would be reasonable to suspend and under what circumstances?
- How might we guard against unintended consequences?

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As the bill to strip dual-national terrorists of their citizenship passes the Senate, it’s worth addressing the misconceptions that critics on both the left and the right are labouring under, writes Jacinta Carroll for The Drum.

Stripping citizenship for terrorism offences has received a lot of attention and commentary in the six months since it was proposed.

For all the discussion, however, there appears to be a lot of misinterpretation and misunderstanding about what the proposal will mean.

The amendments to the Citizenship Act are expected to pass in the Senate this week, so it is useful to reflect on what this will actually mean.

Commentary has ranged from the left expressing outrage at the bill allegedly breaching international humanitarian law and leaving Australians “adrift” internationally, while the right expresses horror that the bill doesn’t go far enough in permanently rooting out all terrorist threats to Australia, and should also be extended to those holding only Australian citizenship.

These unlikely bedfellows share a substantial body of common views on the issue, arguing that individuals suspected of terrorist sympathy and conduct should be subject to substantial and ongoing monitoring and surveillance by law enforcement and where possible “locked up”. Both agree strongly that the bill will have no impact on the terrorist threat in Australia.

The irony of some members of the left arguing for increased surveillance and monitoring throughout the counter-terrorism legislation debate appears to have been missed.

Firstly, context.

What are Australia’s laws?

How does Australia’s proposed approach sit internationally? It might surprise some to know that the way Australia deals with citizenship is not shared by all other countries. Many countries do not permit dual citizenship, or only do so in narrowly prescribed circumstances, and revoke citizenship on grounds including security.

Austria, Norway and Spain, for example amongst others, generally do not allow their citizens to have more than one citizenship. Some that do recognise dual citizenship, including the UK, have or are considering actions to limit it on security grounds. That said, it will be interesting to see how new Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau navigates an election promise to repeal citizenship revocation in the wake of the Paris attacks.

The current Australian system of allowing dual citizenship without renouncing original citizenship is a relatively recent phenomenon, instituted in 1986.

And it was only in 2002 – yes, just over a decade ago – that Australian law was changed to allow citizens to become citizens of another country without renouncing Australian citizenship.

An oath of allegiance, in some form, outlining rights and responsibilities of Australian citizenship has been part of naturalisation as an Australian since 1948.

There are no hard and fast standards of how citizenship may be conferred or withdrawn, and it remains very much a matter for consideration by individual states, and at different times.

In Australia’s case, economic drivers to further migration have featured prominently in our citizenship arrangements for the past 30 years. Security issues have had less prominence, but have nonetheless featured in consideration of citizenship laws, both in the original 1948 Act and the 2007 Citizenship Act. It is reasonable that citizenship has been considered as part of the current review of counter-terrorism arrangements.
Is stripping citizenship legal?
Next, the tricky issue of how this matter sits legally. The Solicitor-General has advised the legislation is legally sound, although it would be beneficial for this advice to be made public rather than provided only to politicians.

Attorney-General George Brandis outlined in the Senate on Tuesday the rationale of the proposed changes, noting that the authority for the state to revoke citizenship in the case of those bearing arms against Australia has been part of our citizenship law since 1948. It is reasonable, he argues, for the existing arrangements to be extended to those who bear arms for a terrorist group, rather than a state, fighting Australia and/or Australia’s interests.

From the logic and principle of both legislation and current modes of conflict, Brandis’ argument is sound. Through the committee process, the legislation has incorporated administrative procedure and review oversight provisions that are commensurate with other actions and are on a par with comparable countries.

How this sits with the Constitution may be up for challenge in the High Court when the provisions are eventually used. Although it will be interesting to see how the public would react to such a case as terrorists have attracted little sympathy to date.

How would it work in practice?
Lastly, how will citizenship revocation work? The provision operates only in specified circumstances. It does only relate to dual nationals but, because of Australia’s international obligations, could not see a person removed to their country of origin if this would put them in danger.

Some who are against the legislation argue that judicial criminal process should be followed instead. This is a misreading of the legislation, which already puts the judicial process to the fore, requiring that citizenship would be revoked only after conviction of terrorism offence with a sentence of six years or more. The only situation where the criminal justice process would not apply is where the individual is overseas; this is also the only case where the terrorism ‘conduct’ provision of citizenship revocation would come into play.

But the real test will be the impact of these changes on the terrorist threat. The answer here is that the citizenship amendments are only a small part of the counter-terrorism puzzle. This is a conservative extension of powers, but can only provide limited utility in countering terrorism, and this may well be the subject of debate after future terrorist acts.

The legislation is an appropriate updating of Australia’s citizenship regime. Having been massaged through months of committee and public review and redrafting, it carries bipartisan support and will become law. The Citizenship Amendment Bill is loathed equally by the fringes of politics, so has all the hallmarks of a reasonable political compromise.

Jacinta Carroll is senior analyst and director, Counter Terrorism Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

CHAPTER 3
Countering extremism and radicalisation

WHAT IS VIOLENT EXTREMISM?
LIVING SAFE TOGETHER WEBSITE ADVICE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

Violent extremism is the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. This includes terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and communal violence.

Violent extremism
When a person's beliefs move from being relatively conventional to being radical, and they want a drastic change in society, this is known as radicalisation. This is not necessarily a bad thing and does not mean these people will become violent.

However, if a person or group decides that fear, terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and then acts accordingly, this is violent extremism.

Violent extremism in Australia
Australia has enjoyed a peaceful history, relatively free from violent extremism. Though the threat to the Australian community from violent extremist behaviour is small, it still exists.

Actions of violent extremists threaten Australia's core values and principles, including human rights, the rule of law, democracy, equal opportunity and freedom. The Australian Government rejects all forms of violent extremism and promotes a harmonious and inclusive society.

Motivations for violent extremism
There are many different types of violent extremism. Motivations are varied and many usually relate to particular ideologies (for example, interpretations of political movements or religious beliefs), issues such as environmental or economic concerns, or ethnic or separatist causes. People can also be motivated by more than one issue.

All forms of violent extremism seek change through fear and intimidation rather than through peaceful means.

Ideological violence
The motivation for violent extremism in Australia is often political. This includes right wing or nationalist extremism which has the goal of preserving the perceived majority culture (usually white/Anglo-Saxon culture/race) at the expense of other cultures. These ideologies justify violence based on patriotism or a belief of superiority to other cultures and races.

In Australia there are a small number of extreme nationalist groups, some of which promote Neo-Nazi type beliefs. They are sometimes called 'hate' groups because of their negative racist propaganda, which is often anti-immigration (e.g. 'keep Australia white'), anti-Semitic or anti-Islam. While their beliefs are offensive to many, their words and actions are not necessarily unlawful. Using or advocating violence to promote these or other beliefs, however, is always unlawful.

Ideological violent extremism can also be motivated by religious beliefs. In this instance the underlying motivation is also generally political, but is justified using interpretations of traditional religious texts and teachings, or following guidance from influential people here and overseas.

In Australia, acts of violence have been committed in the name of many different religions. They have often been planned by small groups or individuals inspired by overseas organisations such as al-Qaeda.

An example of an individual motivated to violent action by an interpretation of religious beliefs is Christian fundamentalist and anti-abortionist Peter James Knight, who killed one person in an attack on an abortion clinic in Melbourne in 2001.
**Issue-based violence**

Violent extremism dedicated to a specific issue or cause such as animal liberation, environmental activism or anti-gun control, is known as ‘issue-based violent extremism’.

Supporters of this type of violent extremism can include groups that are anti-government, anti-globalisation or anti-capitalist.

Activism dedicated to a specific issue can be disruptive but is often used simply to draw attention to a cause through peaceful means. This is a legitimate expression of free speech in Australia.

However, violence, threatening behaviour and/or criminal damage are sometimes advocated by people who want to take their cause a step further. People or groups that use or support violence to promote their cause are of major concern.

For example, in 2009 a group reportedly representing the Earth Liberation Front hand delivered a threatening letter to the head of a large Australian electricity company, stating “your property will not remain safe.”

**Ethno-nationalist or separatist violence**

The actions of groups or individuals involved in violent political or independence struggles based on race, culture or ethnic background either in Australia or overseas are often described as ethno-nationalist or separatist violent extremism.

An example of an ethno-nationalist or separatist violent extremist group is ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), a Basque separatist group seeking independence from Spain for the Basque people.

Countries such as Australia, with large culturally and ethnically diverse communities, are often directly impacted by international conflicts/civil wars.

For example, in the 1980s and 1990s Australians travelled to the former Yugoslavia, and more recently Australians have participated illegally in conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and Somalia. Some people who have trained or fought overseas have also attempted to carry out acts of violent extremism in Australia after returning home from conflict zones.

Individuals have been arrested in Australia for intentionally raising money to assist banned international terrorist organisations involved in ethnically motivated conflicts. For example, people have been convicted of raising money in Australia to support the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.

While such conflicts can evoke strong emotions in communities in Australia and many feel compelled to help those affected, it is important to be aware of the legality of any actions taken.

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n Sydney, two teenagers try to board a plane to the Middle East to fight for Islamic State. In Melbourne, friends and family of Jake Bilardi, the teenager suspected of carrying out a suicide bombing in Iraq, try to come to terms with his actions.

In a week that has seen high-profile examples of young Australians becoming swept up in violent extremism, we spoke to key players about what’s luring young people to the militant group and what can be done to stop it happening.

The community leader
A few months ago, a young Brisbane man came to see Ali Kadri, who works with the Holland Park Mosque in Brisbane, and told him he wanted to make something of his life – that he was a qualified panel beater before he joined a rebel motorcycle gang.

Mr Kadri took the man to Centrelink; he helped him through a Certificate IV in Bookkeeping.

“He likes accounting,” says Mr Kadri, who also runs an accounting firm and works with the Islamic Council of Queensland.

“So he is going to do that, and I am going to employ him, and train him while he is working for me.”

In targeting the roots of violent extremism, Mr Kadri says a key factor is the knock-on effect that can occur when you help a young, marginalised member of the Muslim community – those most susceptible to the lure of extremist ideology, according to Mr Kadri.

“These people go out and then say ‘You know what, Ali’s not all that bad, he can help us get job, we’ll have a career, we’ll have a life, blah blah blah’,” he says.

“But Government doesn’t want to do this; the Government wants to do it their own way, they don’t see it being effective this way. Government is saying: we will tell you who to help. And I’m saying: no, the community knows who to help.”

For Mr Kadri, the Government’s recently announced Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program, in which community organisations specialising in education or counselling can apply for extra funding and become ‘service providers’, is misguided.

“Employment is a problem, alienation is a problem, marginalisation is a problem. So you create a program which attracts people like this. And they will come to you,” he says.

“More likely they will come to you than you going [to them and saying], ‘Listen, the Government has told me that you are becoming a radical’, because then they’ll say ‘F-off’ or they’ll go more into their hole and it’ll be more hard to monitor them.”

The local expert
Associate Professor Anne Aly, the founding chair of People Against Violent Extremism, also says she is “cautious of” an approach whereby the Government identifies who is at risk of radicalisation and pushes them towards so-called service providers.

“There is so much resistance to any kind of government-designed ideas, or policy concepts ... of radicalisation – these kids are going to resist it,” she says. “They need to be done by the people who are more likely to have success in engaging young people.”

Like Ali Kadri, she says the “ripple effect” of getting through to one well-connected, at-risk young person cannot be underestimated. She mentors young Somali men in Perth, where she is based, and gets them involved in her research work at Curtin University.

“These three young men have all seen their friends become radicalised. They have been targeted by radical preachers at one point in their lives. And they have all come into contact with a radicalising influence or a radicalising environment,” she says.

“They have now gone back out there saying, ‘We are doing all this really cool stuff, I’m working in an office’. Now, other young Somali men are saying, ‘Wow, that sounds really good, how can I get involved?’

“You don’t go out and say, ‘Right, you, you’re radicalised, you need deradicalisation, come here, go to this training program, go to this education program, go see this counsellor’. It doesn’t work.”

Associate Professor Aly says while there is a point at which intelligence and monitoring are important, in combating initial radicalisation, the Government should not be taking such a stringent national security-style approach.

“Because it is only ever seen as a national security issue, and the response is only ever going to be a national security response,” she says.

“If you want to do prevention, you are working with young people who haven’t committed any crime and who shouldn’t be on any watch list. But you should be able to engage them in ways that stop them engaging with radicalising influences.

“I understand that people within the Government are well-intentioned, but I think one of the biggest mistakes they are making is assuming that they can drive this, and that they should.”

The international expert
“Some of them are pious, others are not,” says Peter Neumann, director of London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, of the roughly 100 men
and women his organisation has spoken to who have left Western Europe to fight for Islamic State.

"Many have troubled histories – but some would have had great prospects had they stayed in their countries."

Mr Neumann, speaking last month at the White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, touched on a somewhat overlooked aspect of the debate about radicalisation: while marginalisation and a lack of employment or education are common factors among young Western extremists, they are not always present.

“And because their personalities, backgrounds, motivations and indeed experiences in Syria and Iraq are so different, as governments, you should expect that the people who may at some point come back to your countries will pose very different types of challenges,” he said.

Mr Neumann, who worked on the latest UN Security Council resolution on foreign terrorist fighters, says prevention should be a priority in countering the threat of terrorism.

“We know that wannabe fighters have arguments with their parents, and we’ve seen – in a number of cases – that parents have succeeded in making their sons or daughters stay,” he says.

“Parents are our strongest allies; they need to be helped and empowered.”

In regards to the social media approach, Mr Neumann says “there’s a lot of talk about taking content off the internet”, which he regards as worthwhile.

“But we need to spend a lot more time, energy, effort and creative brains to think about ways in which we can engage and challenge extremist ideas online.”

He says the internet is the most powerful tool ever created for the dissemination of ideas – and that we have “handed that tool to the terrorists”.

The integration of communities in Western countries is another important part of prevention, Mr Neumann says.

“They sometimes felt that, because of who they are, how they look and where they come from, they weren’t part of us, that they’d never succeed,” he says.

“That didn’t turn them into terrorists by osmosis, but it made them open to an ideology which says that the West is at war with you and that you can’t be European and Muslim at the same time.”

“If we’re serious about wanting to reduce the pool of people who are susceptible to the messages and narratives of violent extremists, that’s where we need to start.”

The Government

Dr Clarke Jones, a former government national security official and now visiting fellow at ANU, says the Government should set up a centre for expertise to liaise with the proposed community service providers.

“The way it has been going, there has been a lot of money being thrown at these small, individual programs, and I don’t think there’s been enough assessment – firstly whether they are appealing to the right people, whether the money is going to right place, what is the effectiveness of those programs.”

Last month, a report into Australia’s counter-terrorism strategies recommended “significantly boosting” the Government’s CVE program, with a focus on expanding “community and public-private partnerships to better reach at-risk or radicalised individuals”. It followed new funding in August last year for community groups to take on these service provider roles.

Given social media is a key method of recruitment for Islamic State and similar militant groups, part of the Government’s program is tailored towards helping people “develop the digital skills to critically assess terrorists’ claims”. In the US, the State Department has several social media accounts that disseminate anti-propaganda – calling out the hypocrisy of IS, for example, using images and Arabic text.

“There is so much resistance to any kind of government-designed ideas, or policy concepts … of radicalisation – these kids are going to resist it. They need to be done by the people who are more likely to have success in engaging young people.”

Associate Professor Anne Aly

Last month, Attorney-General George Brandis flagged $18 million in funding for “real-time social media monitoring”, saying the Government must move beyond the idea that the internet was a lawless space.

“[Those measures] will include an active takedown of terrorist websites and terrorist postings, and also funding of civil society organisations to establish counter-narratives to combat and contest terrorist narratives that are being mediated online.”

A spokesperson for the Attorney-General’s department said the new measures would include a report online extremism tool and would see the Government work with the Australian Communication and Media Authority and others to get extremist propaganda removed from the internet.

The Government also plans to work with the states and territories to focus on prison radicalisation, whereby those behind bars are introduced to extremist views by their fellow inmates.
Dr Clarke Jones says Australians convicted of travelling to fight with IS should not be incarcerated in maximum security prisons, provided they have not committed serious acts of “barbaric” violence.

That may just further radicalise them, he says, suggesting a diversionary course with a focus on reform and rehabilitation – particularly if the offender is young – would be better.

“I disagree with the Government that they should be thrown into maximum security prison. And I say that on good grounds – I am probably the only one that has done empirical research in this area,” he says.

“I think the way we put [offenders] into Goulburn Supermax or Barwon Prison, it doesn’t leave much avenue for rehabilitation. So we need to revisit that because they will come out, and they will come out worse.

“The focus is on punishment, and with the political rhetoric that is going around at the moment I don’t think that’s likely to change in the short term.”

The former terrorism suspect

Zaky Mallah, 31, says he knows how these young Australians being drawn to the Middle East are feeling.

As a disaffected 19-year-old, he filmed a video of himself authorities said contained threats to carry out an attack on government offices in Sydney and was charged under counter-terrorism laws.

He was kept in Goulburn Supermax for two years before being acquitted and now regularly meets with government and ASIO officials to offer his insight.

“I had my passport refused by ASIO back in 2002 ... I was very angry, very emotional,” he says.

“Lucky I didn’t become a lone wolf. I was a very, very passionate, angry young man because my freedom was taken away.”

Mr Mallah, from Parramatta, says one of the reasons young men find IS attractive is because it is a “war machine”.

“People love guns, they love armies, they love tanks ... it’s like a game,” he says.

“Except that this is a reality now. It’s no longer PlayStation or Xbox now – this is now the real thing.”

Mr Mallah says trying convince a young person on the path to radicalisation that going to Syria to fight for IS is a bad idea is extremely difficult.

“In our faith, the caliphate must be established,” he says, referring to Sunni Islam.

“Now, I am a big believer in the Muslim caliphate [being] established, after the Ottoman empire, however I don’t believe that the caliphate of ISIS is a legitimate one.”

Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic political party, also supports the establishment of a caliphate – and has come in for staunch criticism from Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who calls it “un-Australian” for “making excuses for terrorist organisations”.

In a heated interview with the ABC last year, the group’s spokesman, Wassim Doureihi, refused to condemn the actions of Islamic State.

But Mr Mallah says the Government, by seeking to designate Hizb ut-Tahrir a terrorist group, is shooting itself in the foot.

“A lot of these youth look up to Hizb ut-Tahrir as a way to say, ‘look, we don’t have to go overseas and join ISIS, we can call for the establishment of the caliphate from Australia.’ Not that we want one here, but at least we can join a party that has those same views ... and call for a caliphate while living in peace in Australia.”

“But when we do that, the Government cracks down and says, ‘we want to ban this and label it a terrorist organisation’. That further subjugates, isolates, segregates many of us in the Muslim community.

“I believe Hizb ut-Tahrir is the last line of defence [to stop] many of these youths who want to travel overseas to join ISIS.”

The police

The Australian Federal Police established its first Islamic Liaison Team in Melbourne in 2007, and that model is continuing to spread to other cities.

The aim is to strengthen ties between the Islamic community and law enforcement and build trust, something Ali Kadri says gets eroded when politicians make strong-armed statements about the threat of Islamic extremism “for [their] own political gain”.

The AFP says better relationships mean any tensions that arise from police operations, such as anti-terrorism raids, can be worked through.

The AFP hosts events like dinners to celebrate the end of Ramadan, allowing local Islamic community members to meet with AFP officials, and tries to counter the online propaganda of foreign groups like Islamic State by providing “alternative narratives” to the ones that appear in its dogma.

A youth forum in Sydney, which aimed to improve the image of the police among young Muslims, will also be run in Brisbane, where a spokesperson said it would “engage identified at-risk youth and influential persons to build confidence in the relationships between the community and law enforcement”.

Dr Jones from ANU says some of the law enforcement programs being used are doing good work.

“Not all police programs are going to turn people away – it will suit some and not others,” he says.

“When police, whether it’s state or federal, have this sharp end or hard edge to their activities ... if I can use the analogy, it’s very hard to punch someone in the face and then shake their hand,” he says.

“If they are doing raids, because they are unsure of the activity that is going on, and police raids are increasing, then it is very hard to also be the softie and the good guy.”
RADICALISATION AND THE LONE WOLF: WHAT WE DO AND DON’T KNOW

The factors that result in radicalisation are complex and varied, according to terrorism expert and academic, Anne Aly

The events of the Sydney siege this week evolved amid a torrent of speculation and theorising about the motivations and intent of the hostage-taker Man Haron Monis. Some media reporting during the Sydney siege even sought to compare the incident to America’s 9/11 and the London bombings in 2005.

The fact Monis forced his hostages to raise the flag bearing the Islamic testimony of faith certainly suggested that he may have been a radicalised violent extremist acting with a political or ideological motive.

Violent extremism describes a situation in which the extreme belief in a social, political or ideological cause is coupled with a belief that violence is necessary and justified as a means to further that cause.

Violent extremism describes a situation in which the extreme belief in a social, political or ideological cause is coupled with a belief that violence is necessary and justified as a means to further that cause.

What about the internet?

Research suggests that the internet plays some role in radicalisation though assumptions about the role of the internet in self-radicalising individuals are overstated. Empirical evidence supports the assumption that the internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised and serves as a space for individuals to find support for their ideas among like-minded individuals.

But there is no support for the assumption that the internet accelerates radicalisation and promotes self-radicalisation without physical contact.

Research has also shown that theories and assumptions about radicalisation are not supported in many cases of violent extremism.

The marginalisation hypothesis that argues that radicalisation is a result of individual frustration and alienation does not explain why some who have travelled to fight alongside the so-called Islamic State come from well-adjusted family backgrounds and were well-integrated in the broader community.

Contrary to popular belief, ideology and religion play a less

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Very few extremists actually become radicalised to the operational phase where they carry out acts of violence – but those that do can perpetrate horrendous crimes in the name of their adopted cause.

important role in radicalisation. Current research by the Countering Online Violent Extremism Research Program at Curtin University, with which I am involved, indicates that the emotional appeal to personal identity and group solidarity are far more significant factors in radicalisation.

**The ‘lone wolf’ theory**

Even with the growing body of empirical research contributing to understanding radicalisation, cases such as that of Man Haron Monis raise questions about whether individual actors, known as ‘lone wolves’, are terrorists, violent extremists, radicals or simply lone gunmen.

We normally associate terrorism with large-scale or mass casualty attacks such as 9/11 and the Bali bombings in 2002 – attacks of the sort that require significant planning, resourcing and coordination – often transnational.

But the strategy of leaderless or single-actor terrorism dates back to the 19th century anarchists who carried out political assassinations and bombings. In the 1980s and 1990s the strategy of using single individuals to perpetrate attacks was adopted by the white supremacist movement in the United States as a way of thwarting government crackdowns on their activities.

In fact, the term ‘lone wolfism’ was introduced by Tom Metzger, a white supremacist.

Over the past few years lone-actor attacks have become more and more prevalent. Lone wolves are individuals who commit acts of violence in support of a group, though they may have no formal links to that group. Examples include Canadian Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, Anders Breivik in Norway and Mohammed Merah in France.

Each case is unique but all share the hallmarks of the lone actor. Breivik demonstrated extreme right-wing political views and wrote a 1,500-page manifesto rationalising his attacks and his extremist ideology. Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who shot a Canadian soldier earlier this year, had his passport cancelled and was suspected of planning to travel to abroad as a foreign fighter.

French gunman Mohammed Merah, who killed seven people in a shooting spree in France in 2012, claimed to be an associate of Al Qaeda. In each of these cases, including that of Monis, ideology or politics certainly appear to be the motivating force behind the violence, suggesting the actors were radicalised.

But there are also other factors to consider when distinguishing lone-wolf terrorist acts from similar attacks with no apparent motivation other than the actors own mental capacity or tendency for violence. Both Bibeau and Monis had criminal records and a history of violent behaviour.

Reports on Bibeau describe his behaviour before the attack as disturbing. Monis also exhibited erratic behaviour and could possibly have had a mental illness.

Official reports on Breivik indicated that he developed paranoid schizophrenia. Like Monis, Breivik exhibited high levels of narcissism and grandiose delusions.

What these cases tell us is that, unlike the strategic model of terrorism as a rational choice to carry out acts of violence in the name of a cause, these modern-day lone-wolf terrorists may be more like lone gunmen than terrorists.

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Understanding the radicalisation process

It is important to understand what the radicalisation process looks like, in order for families, friends and communities to help prevent acts of violent extremism, according to this Living Safe Together fact sheet from the Australian Government.

The radicalisation process

There is no single pathway of radicalisation towards violent extremism, as the process is unique to each person. However, there are some common elements in the experiences of most people who have become radicalised in Australia, regardless of their beliefs or motivations.

These elements include significant behavioural changes in major areas of a person’s life including ideology, social relations and criminal activity. If someone is radicalising towards violent extremism, changes can often occur in all three of these areas.

A person’s behaviour must also become more intense and extreme over time, when compared with that person’s previous or ‘normal’ behaviour. Their circumstances and environment should also be taken into account.

If there is a valid alternative explanation for the changes in behaviour, these changes should not be considered a sign of radicalisation.

If a person radicalises to the point of promoting, threatening or using violence for an extremist cause, the Australian Government and the wider community have a responsibility to act.

Ideology

In the process of radicalisation, ideology refers to a significant shift in the way a person views the world. Ideologies are only concerning if they advocate the use of violence or other unlawful activity to promote particular beliefs.

As the radicalisation process builds, some people will promote an increasingly strict and literal understanding of a given belief. They may increasingly use ideological language that vilifies or discriminates others. In Australia, the small numbers of people who radicalise and promote violence often do not have a genuine understanding of the ideology they claim to represent.

Increasing religious devoutness or commitment to unconventional beliefs is not the same as radicalisation towards violent extremism.
The use of the internet to view, download and spread material promoting violent extremism is often part of the radicalisation process. Some people may occasionally view such material out of curiosity, but people who are radicalising tend to collect and share this material with others who hold the same beliefs.

Hateful ideology and anti-social ideas might be disturbing or offensive, but if someone has not committed to using violence or advocating the use of violence, it should not be considered radicalisation to violent extremism.

Social relations

Many people join extremist groups for social reasons. In Australia, people are most vulnerable to involvement in violent extremism through the influence of close personal relationships. This is especially true for young people.

If a person radicalises to the point of promoting, threatening or using violence for an extremist cause, the Australian Government and the wider community have a responsibility to act.

As people start to become radical, they will often pull away from normal, mainstream activities and friendship groups. There may be conflict with family and friends over political or ideological views.

At the same time, some people will start to interact more often with smaller, tight-knit networks of people who share their specific beliefs. Some extreme groups may even require a person to go through an initiation or take an oath of allegiance to prove their commitment.

Radicalisation is most often led by personal face-to-face relationships, but there are some examples of recruitment into radical groups over the internet. A person may become part of an online community of people who share their views and radicalise in a virtual environment.

Criminal activity

During the radicalisation process, a person may start to ‘act up’ to draw attention to their beliefs or send a message to a specific group. These activities might not cause serious harm but might still be illegal. They might include actions like vandalism, minor property damage, trespassing or illegal protesting.

More radicalised individuals might try to influence a government or a section of the community by making threats. If someone begins to support the use of violence to promote a cause, radicalisation to violent extremism becomes a serious concern.

Once a person becomes committed to violent action, an actual violent attack may take place very quickly. If a person considers unlawful and criminal activity to be acceptable, they might also become increasingly suspicious and cautious. This might mean that they become nervous about the activities of governments, security and intelligence agencies or law enforcement.

Identifying radicalisation

Most individuals begin the radicalisation process in one of the three key areas – ideology, social relations or criminal activity. This normally means that a person’s behaviour will noticeably change in one area first, and not across all three areas at the same time, but change in these areas can happen very quickly.

Most people do not go all the way to becoming a violent extremist. Something or someone might interrupt the radicalisation process, and the person does not get to the point of threatening or using violence, and may even reject their radical ideas. When this happens it is called disengagement. The active involvement of families, friends and the community in this process is very important.

More information

If you are concerned somebody you know may be radicalising, you can find more in the following information sheet (see next page): I am worried somebody I know is radicalising ... What can I do? © Commonwealth of Australia 2015.

I am worried somebody I know is radicalising … what can I do?

If you are worried somebody you know may be ‘radicalising’ there is a range of strategies and services that may be of assistance. A fact sheet from the Australian Government website, Living Safe Together

SOMEONE IS BECOMING A RADICAL

When someone begins to separate from their family, friends and community or demonstrates a significant move towards extreme beliefs and attitudes, that person may be in the early stages of the radicalisation process. If that same person begins to advocate or promote the use of violence to achieve an ideological, political or religious goal, they may be radicalising towards violent extremism.

OPEN COMMUNICATION

The best way to deal with the problem of radicalisation is to maintain open communication with the person. A positive relationship and open communication can be an effective intervention in itself. Even if someone decides to separate themselves from close friends and family, these people will still be helpful to them in the future.

To help them, listen to their reasons for becoming involved with a radical ideology or group. Try to understand their perspective. It is also important to separate their behaviour from who they are as a person. Even if you disagree with what they are saying, it is important to find some way to let them know they are accepted and that you are there to help them.

EARLY INTERVENTION

Early intervention is best. However, before you try to intervene, try to fully understand a person’s situation and motivation.

A significant event, or a build-up of incidents, can trigger and/or accelerate the radicalisation process. If issues can be dealt with before they become large problems, this may prevent a person from radicalising further.

These issues may include:
• Confrontations with family members
• Changes in living or employment situation
• Exposure to hateful attitudes and actions, either as a victim or as an offender
• Overseas events that harm their community, family or friends
• Personal issues such as health problems, addiction, anger or social problems
• Negative changes in friendships and/or personal relationships
• Dropping out of school or university, and
• The experience of discrimination or social unfairness.

You should not assume that any one of these problems will lead a person to radicalise, but intervention and assistance from immediate family and the community to help deal with any of these types of issues can be particularly effective in preventing the radicalisation process.

There is a wide range of social and health services available to all Australians. These include:
• Education and employment services
• Health services
• Housing services
• Mental health and counselling
• Refugee help services
• Religious and cultural centres
• Telephone counselling services, and
• Youth community centres.

If you cannot approach a service provider directly, ask a friend, colleague or your local doctor to assist. These services are there to help all Australians deal with issues and become active, contributing members of their community. Once specific issues have been identified and addressed, it may be that no further intervention is required.

However, those who are undergoing the radicalisation process often become increasingly difficult to communicate with. They may refuse many well-intentioned attempts to help them. This can be hurtful but such refusals should not discourage those around them from trying to intervene to help the person.

WHAT ELSE CAN I DO?

If a person continues to promote the use of violence and other illegal activities to achieve an ideological, religious or political goal, a stronger intervention may be required. The most helpful response involves early action by concerned families, friends and communities, with further assistance from government services where needed, in the three areas of a person’s life impacted by radicalisation – social relations, ideology and criminal activity.
**Social responses**

If someone has withdrawn from close friends and family and is spending significant amounts of time with a group that is hostile towards others, a social response may be the most appropriate.

Most people who have been involved with extremist groups say that having a trusted adult to talk to would have made the biggest difference in preventing them becoming involved.

- Connect them with encouraging role models in their life such as respected family members, coaches or teachers
- Involve local youth or social workers
- Assist in enrolling them in education, training or employment
- Try to get them involved in positive social activities with new peers

**Ideological responses**

Searching for meaning and belief is a part of human nature. However, if someone does not have a strong background in the traditions of their beliefs, their incomplete knowledge makes them vulnerable to negative ideas and radicalisation. Proper guidance is important.

If an individual is embracing aggressive and hostile attitudes based on ideological (including religious or political) teachings, then an ideological response could help.

- Involve respected leaders to help provide guidance and give solid grounding in their particular religious, political or ideological tradition
- Find ways to get them involved in constructive community or political activities that enable them to put their values and beliefs into positive action
- Provide guidance on how to question ideas, texts and leaders respectfully without resorting to violent attitudes
- Help them interact respectfully with others of different belief systems and to accept difference
- Provide opportunities for them to participate positively in intellectual, political or philosophical discussions with people from a wide range of beliefs

**Behavioural responses**

Some people become involved in inter-group violence and other illegal activities after becoming socially involved with an extremist group. In other cases, someone already involved with low level crime may adopt ideological or religious reasoning to justify their criminal actions.

Strategies to change the person’s actions back to legal and non-violent methods may help in preventing them from becoming radicalised.

- Help them get involved in community actions that peacefully address their political or social justice concerns
- Connect them to a positive role model or mentor who understands their behaviour and views
- Involve them in a behavioural program with a trained counsellor
- Approach community or police multicultural liaison officers to help you find appropriate ways to support the person
- Help them comply with any existing court appointments or orders

**THREATS OF HARM**

In the event that someone indicates they are going to harm themselves or other people, this should be taken seriously and must be acted upon immediately.

While this level of radicalisation is very rare, it is not helpful to the person or the community to ignore such behaviour.

If you are worried that somebody you know may be radicalising to violent extremism, contact one of the numbers listed below. The identity of callers will be kept confidential.

- Call the National Security Hotline on 1800 1234 00 if you are worried somebody you know may be radicalising to the point of violence
- Contact the police on 000 if someone you know has threatened to harm you or someone else
- If you do not speak English well, call the Translating and Interpreting Hotline on 13 14 50 and ask them to contact the National Security Hotline or the emergency services and interpret for you.

**YOU ARE NOT ALONE**

Many people and communities in Australia have helped to move people away from radicalisation to violent extremism.

As a friend, family or community member providing assistance, it is important to look after yourself as well. Speak with trusted people in your community or other families who have had similar experiences, or contact a support service such as Lifeline on 13 11 14.

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TOUGH IS NOT ENOUGH: TEN SMARTER WAYS TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Governments have generally invested much more in hard-edged military and policing responses than in smarter and more sustainable ‘soft power’ approaches to countering violent extremism, writes Michele Grossman

More than a decade of security-based trans-national approaches to combating terrorist activity and propaganda have demonstrated that these alone are ineffective. Sometimes, security measures can actually damage efforts to roll back the appeal and take-up of violent extremism. While such measures should be used in domestic contexts where threats are critical or imminent, failure to accompany these with robust ‘soft power’ initiatives will prove fatal in the longer-term.

Business as usual is not an option. Here is what needs to change if we are to succeed in countering violent extremism.

1. Rethink current approaches to creating a counter-narrative
Counter-narrative remains a key strategy in the struggle to diminish violent extremism’s appeal, especially for young people. Governments around the world have been slow to respond to community needs and desires regarding this.

Most governments now accept that credible counter-narratives must be community – rather than government-generated. Yet many agencies have remained ambivalent about forming genuine partnerships with community organisations that can develop authentic counter-narratives to reach and, more importantly, influence those at risk.

Communities have tuned out to the ‘negative case’ made by standard counter-narratives. They are seeking more ‘affirmative’ narratives that offer genuine alternatives to hatred, enmity and terror.

Greater effort is needed to promote social inclusion and community belonging for those who feel marginalised and disempowered. This involves focusing on what binds us together rather than on what divides us.

An inclusive narrative must acknowledge the social and political idealism that makes some young people vulnerable to dimensions of terrorist messaging that promise a new or better world. We must offer genuine alternative forms of social activism and transformation, which explicitly reject violence while seeking change.

2. Follow the lead of Germany and Denmark in rehabilitating returned fighters
Counter-narratives are not just about what we say but also what we do. This includes how we treat those returning from foreign conflicts.

While it is clear that some foreign fighters return home hardened and committed to violent extremism, others do not. They find themselves disillusioned by the gap between the propaganda and the reality of foreign conflict. Rehabilitation for this latter group is essential.

The Hayat program in Germany and the Aarhus program in Denmark are good examples of how to bypass over-securitisation of returned fighters and instead offer counselling, support and rehabilitation. These programs acknowledge the different reasons people participate in foreign conflicts. These reasons include idealism, humanitarianism and peer pressure, as well as a commitment to violent extremism as an ideology.

A key benefit of rehabilitating returnees is that they have greater credibility with potential recruits and can positively influence them.

Embracing those who respond to rehabilitation demonstrates the principles of a supportive society. That in itself is a powerful message to undermine the narrative of alienation, isolation and rejection that terrorist recruiters promote.

3. Assertively challenge media’s role in fostering disunity and xenophobia
Some media reporting can severely undermine the crucial message of social inclusion by amplifying xenophobia, eroding trust and promoting social disharmony. The more coverage of terrorist-related issues demonises Muslim communities at large, the more entrenched a victim mentality can become for those targeted by sensationalised coverage.

- THERE'S NO-ONE HERE...

- AL QAEDA...

- JUST IDEOLOGY...
The sense of being ‘under siege’ by media is experienced by the vast majority of peaceful Muslims around the world. This produces frustration, humiliation and fear for these communities and can actually increase radicalisation leading to violent extremism.

Such coverage also encourages attacks on ordinary Muslims in diaspora communities because it appears to legitimise such actions. Those who experience such targeting become more mistrustful of the democracies in which they live. This makes them less likely to co-operate with authorities, even when they have important information or views to share.

The ‘us and them’ narratives of much media reporting need to be confronted assertively, by governments as much as by communities.

4. Demystify the ‘special nature’ of violent extremism

Part of the appeal of violent extremism is that it seems to transcend ordinary criminal violence. It is characterised as a higher form of social action, in which forms of social, religious and ideological power and aspiration combine to reach beyond the ordinary and everyday.

An effective way to diminish the appeal of violent extremism is to demonstrate that it is no different from other, more mundane violence. Stripped of its romanticised trappings as a higher calling, violent extremism should be treated as part of a broad-spectrum campaign against violence of all kinds.

This approach exposes the ordinariness of violence, its consequences and its failure to achieve the promise of social change that lures many young people.

5. Use social media more often, more strategically and more creatively

Social media outlets have been exploited by those promoting online dimensions of radicalisation and violent extremism. Sustained effort to challenge extremist messaging and representation through social media has been lacking, yet examples of effective strategies do exist.

Programs such as All Together Now in Australia and Exit in Europe are leading the way in helping disengage those on pathways to extremism through social media. While in democratic countries censorship of social media remains untenable for excellent reasons, much more could be done, more nimbly and more creatively, to use social media as a counter-strategy.

If, as some leading research has argued, terrorism is a communicative act, then we need to invest seriously in challenging and disrupting its messaging using the same communication channels and strategies.

A key element here is embracing multimodal communication platforms that combine image, text and sound to reach people in the same way that sophisticated violent extremist propaganda routinely achieves.

6. Develop cognitive and emotional skills to deconstruct extremist ideology

Education is a key to disrupting and dismantling terrorist ideology. In an age awash with information, media and diverse forms of knowledge, many young people struggle with the critical skills required to sift, sort and evaluate it all.

These cognitive and emotional skills need to be comprehensively embedded in the curricula of schools and universities. The goal must be to equip young people to evaluate and argue against the interpretations of religion, history, politics and identity that are the bread and butter of terrorist recruitment narratives.

Nor should we stop at the cognitive domain in thinking about how best to skill up our youth to critique and reject violent extremist ideology. Terrorist messaging does not just target the head. It focuses in increasingly sophisticated ways on the heart through visual and aural communication.

Understanding the nexus between cognition and emotion, and developing in young people the understanding and ability to step back and analyse before acting, should be a primary focus of any counter-terrorism strategy.

7. Understanding the ‘supply chain’ means targeting recruiters

Recruiters are the middle-men and women in the supply chain of violent extremism. Counter-terrorism strategies have tended to focus on grassroots initiatives to prevent the take-up of violent extremism at community level, while ‘disrupt and degrade’ efforts have concentrated on the leadership of terrorist groups.

Focusing on remote figureheads may help score largely symbolic goals for governments and taskforces. But the middle-men and women, as always, are the linchpin. Without them the leaders cannot marshal the human resources to execute their strategies.

Targeting recruiters should not just be about
removing them from circulation – as a securitisation model would propose. It should also aim to undermine their influence with alternatives that speak to the deeper needs and desires of those susceptible to their influence. It is vital to work with communities to identify, understand the strategies of and disempower locally influential recruiters in order to nullify their messages and reduce their reach and appeal.

8. Women are emerging as key players in violent extremism

Programs to counter violent extremism tend to focus on alienated, angry young men and the ways that certain constructs of masculinity and violence may be linked. But the complexities of contemporary violent extremism have increasingly seen women emerge as influential players – as spokespeople, recruiters, enablers and in some instances as fighters.

While female fighters and violent extremists are hardly new, complex issues involving power, disenfranchisement and agency for women are making themselves felt in new ways.

Strategies relying on the assumption that women are generally key influencers away from violent extremism need to be rethought. While this may be true in some instances, the increased involvement of women in terrorist propaganda and social influence suggests a more complex social and gendered territory. It raises the question of whether we need to develop more nuanced, gendered strategies of countering violent extremism.

9. Community, community, community

All of the previous points require deep, long-lasting, inclusive partnerships with communities at a grassroots level. A signal weakness in transnational strategies to date has been the tendency of government agencies to focus relationship-building efforts on selected community leaders.

These leaders, while important in some instances, are only part of the story. Communities are increasingly telling us that an older generation of leaders lacks the credibility, authority or authenticity to work effectively with younger community members who are radicalising towards violence.

The central issue of trust – the single most important element in brokering successful joint efforts between governments and communities to mitigate violent extremism – goes well beyond developing trust and engagement with a relatively small number of community leaders. They may sometimes lack the backing of critical elements within their own constituencies.

We must be smarter, more expansive and more multi-layered in developing community relationships. A multi-level strategy – one that targets and builds grassroots trust, transparency and engagement as well as cultivating leadership roles and government liaison – is far more likely to succeed in tackling violent extremism than one that is narrowly focused on selected representatives and structures.

These structures often exclude women, young people and voices of difference or dissent within communities. These groups are precisely those we need to engage if we are to mount credible alternatives to violent extremism. This means listening carefully and genuinely to what communities are saying, and adopting not only a ‘whole of government’ but a ‘whole of community’ strategy.

10. Help researchers by sharing key data and information

National security expert Marc Sageman recently published an essay calling for greater leverage of research capacity by government agencies concerned with countering violent extremism. Sageman focuses on ways in which government agencies’ reluctance to share primary source data have stalled research capabilities – an essential contribution to the evidence base on which strategies, policies and programs are founded.

Intelligence agencies have the empirical data but not the methodological skills to analyse and interpret these; researchers have the analytical and methodological skills but lack the data. The result is that breakthroughs in understanding terrorism and how to counter it are being impeded.

A smart strategy would develop security-sensitive ways of giving researchers the data they need. This would help spur transnational effectiveness by enabling researchers to develop the large, robust datasets and theoretical underpinnings that are essential to serious inquiry in this space. Without this, research remains a severely under-utilised resource.

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GEN Y JIHADISTS: PREVENTING RADICALISATION IN AUSTRALIA

Following is the final chapter from an Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, which presents nine policy recommendations on how to strengthen Australia’s response to terrorists and extremist jihadists.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Australia’s counter-terrorism policies cover a vast range of responses, from military operations in the Middle East to community resilience and deradicalisation programs. Over more than a decade, and with renewed emphasis since late 2013, there’s been intense federal and growing state government policy activity. Here we recommend nine steps, in some cases building on current or nascent programs, to strengthen the Australian response to defeat terrorists and Gen Y extremist jihadists.

1. Explain the reasons for Australia’s Middle East deployments more persuasively

Australia has a long history of fighting wars in the Middle East. Participation in those conflicts was based on contemporary judgements about our strategic interest, but our policy focus on the region has been inconsistent and driven by crises. We have few deep specialists in the Middle East in any part of public administration. The strategic drivers of change in the Middle East are seldom publicly explained or related to the purpose of Australian military involvement. A deeper knowledge of the region will produce more effective counter-terrorism policies.

The government should ensure that our diplomatic presence in the Middle East is sufficient to address the security interests that we claim to have there. This calls for modestly increased investment in Australian diplomatic, intelligence and defence engagement in the region. The opening of an Australian diplomatic mission in Doha, announced in May 2015, is a welcome development.

Based on a developing deeper understanding of the region, the Australian Government should continue the practice adopted in recent years of making regular statements to Parliament about Australia’s military operations and counter-terrorism interests in the Middle East, including setting out the strategic rationale for those activities. The government should also engage more directly with online critics of Australian policy by using means such as ministers’ and senior officials’ speeches, opinion pieces in newspapers and credible websites.

2. Urgently expand counter-terrorism cooperation with key international partners

Following a late April 2015 visit to Paris, Prime Minister Abbott and President Francois Hollande issued a joint statement promising to:

• Deepen our exchanges on national security policy, including responses to terrorism, countering violent extremism and online radicalisation
• Extend our dialogue on the challenges posed by the phenomenon of foreign fighters
• Further strengthen intelligence cooperation
• Establish a program of exchanges in counter-terrorism policing, including on tactical response policing (Abbott 2015a).

This is a welcome measure, albeit one that challenges Canberra’s dogged orthodoxy that Australia’s foreign policy interests reside solely in Asia. Australia has a deep interest in working with like-minded countries not only on police and intelligence cooperation but to strengthen policy thinking on domestic counter-radicalisation. That should prompt an expansion of the Prime Minister’s initiative to Germany, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries. These countries are in effect the new front line in dealing with a wave of radicalisation sweeping Western societies. Substantial international cooperation already takes place, most effectively with Australia’s Five Eyes intelligence partners – the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand. But the tempo needs to be stepped up if it’s to address the demands of domestic security in an accelerating threat environment.

Australia could play an important international role by gathering the best thinking on policy, intelligence and policing on counter-terrorism and deradicalisation strategies. This should include more active sharing of the profiles of individuals who have been radicalised, as a foundation for thinking about necessary responses. The Establishment of a Foreign Fighters Taskforce under the auspices of the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) is directed to strengthening international cooperation in this area. The Commission reported to Senate Estimates hearings in May 2015 that it was “deploying officers in the coming year to Asia, the USA, Canada, Europe and the Middle East. We are doing that in conjunction with the Australian Federal Police and other partners internationally” (Dawson 2015, p.52). The ACC has coercive powers to compel individuals and organisations to provide information when questioned. In September 2014 the ACC advised that they had “conducted 40 coercive hearings on 24 individuals” in the previous twelve months (Keenan 2014).

Of course, cooperation with European and North American partners shouldn’t come at the expense of regional engagement, but, with the exception of work...
with Singapore and Japan, this engagement will be more likely to focus on responses than on preventive measures.

3. **Set a new basis for collaboration with Australian Muslims**

Writing in *The Australian*, Deakin University academic Shahram Akbarzadeh (2015) set out the challenging reality for Australian Muslims:

> ... let’s not forget Muslim community organisations have a big role to play. It may not be clear to some, but Australian Muslims are the first to suffer the consequences of terrorism. The shame of having a member of the faith commit acts of violence in the name of religion, and the subsequent anti-Muslim backlash, affect all Australian Muslims. They have a stake in addressing extremism and need to be acknowledged as partners for an effective counter-terrorism strategy.

There’s no escaping this difficult situation. While the vast majority of Australian Muslims have no sympathy for or engagement with Islamist radicals, the Muslim community must be part of a coherent national response to terrorism. Australia as a whole must find a way to work with Australian Muslims that’s creative and respectful and doesn’t blame the community for the behaviour of a tiny group. There’s no substitute for dialogue at many levels, but counter-terrorism presents something of a linguistic minefield. In late 2014, Prime Minister Abbott used the term ‘Team Australia’ to describe his sense of the community effort needed to address terrorism:

> I can’t make myself plainer. This is not about any particular community, this is about crime and potential crime ... [A]s far as I am concerned, every Australian is part of our team. Every Australian is part of our team. The phrase I like is ‘Team Australia’ and the beauty of Team Australia is that anybody who is prepared to show a commitment to this country is part of it. (Abbott, 2014)

Although well-intended, arguably the language didn’t resonate well with people who felt alienated from the community and unable to benefit from mainstream community life. It’s notable that the Prime Minister has ceased to use the ‘Team Australia’ phrase. An important way to restart this discussion would be for the Prime Minister, perhaps with the involvement of the Leader of the Opposition, to establish an advisory council on counter-terrorism and the community.

Any engagement program needs to operate on the basis that there is no single Muslim community in Australia; there are a variety of diverse communities based on different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and on different interpretations of Islam. Understanding diversity and accommodating this to policy is key.

Initiatives to foster resilience within communities,
as set out in Living Safe Together, should be continued. We should also recognise that those disengaged and possibly more susceptible to extremism are not likely to listen to community leaders. There’s a need to ensure that attempts to engage at-risk people filter down to the levels of the community where it is most needed, and that these messages will indeed be accessible.

An effort should be made to include young people and others who aren’t part of formal community groups, as well as respected Muslim community leaders. Empowering young members of Muslim communities in their religious and secular endeavours could enable new forms of community leadership. A platform to tell ‘success stories’ of Muslim Australians might help to promote social cohesion amongst Muslims and non-Muslims nationally. A key task will be to build trust within this group, which will happen only after a sustained effort to discuss, listen and collaborate.

4. Engage schools in a practical discussion about terrorism and counter-radicalisation

A younger group of people is being attracted to violent jihad in the Middle East. The internet and social media may just be the latest communications channel available to terror groups, but they are particularly effective means to direct unfiltered messages to specific groups at the same time as allowing communication between like-minded people. As jihadists get younger, our attention must turn to what schools teach and how they manage at-risk students.

On the curriculum front, schools face substantial time pressures to teach all necessary subjects. But there’s surely a case to start discussing Australia’s contemporary role in the Middle East – perhaps as a follow-on to studies on Gallipoli, which was also a key strategic challenge a century ago. The New South Wales History K-10 syllabus, for example, allows for at least the possibility of classes on contemporary security issues in the subject ‘Australia and the modern world’ (Board of Studies, n.d.). This should be broadened so that students can access balanced information on the Middle East and terrorism, rather than relying on radical online material.

How schools should deal with students showing potential signs of radicalisation is an even more delicate topic. Under the Living Safe Together initiative, the Australian Government provides online advice aimed at helping people to recognise whether an individual may be radicalising (AGD, n.d. d). Counter-radicalisers say that early intervention is advisable and point to the range of social and health care services available to all Australians but, aside from that, thinking about the early intervention roles that schools could play is at a promising but tentative stage.

In May 2015, the Victorian Government announced that it would provide $25 million over four years “to enlist young role models to engage with people at risk of radicalisation” (Tomazin 2015). The initiative will involve the state’s education, youth, multicultural affairs and police agencies and community representatives. It’s likely that more state government initiatives will follow. Although welcome, the proliferation of governments, agencies and groups all pursuing counter-radicalisation initiatives has the potential to create confusion.

Given the complexity of this issue and the numbers of players involved, a useful approach would be for the Australian Government to raise this issue in discussions at the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). The COAG meeting of 17 April 2015 agreed that a new national counter-terrorism strategy would be developed. This would include developing strategies to “work with communities to identify and manage individuals at risk of radicalisation”, and lead to further discussion at a COAG retreat in July 2015 (COAG 2015). The role of schools should be front and centre in this discussion. On 24 May 2015, it was announced that Education Minister Christopher Pyne is seeking to develop a “national strategy to combat radicalisation and extremism in schools” and that this is to be discussed with state education ministers. This is a necessary and welcome development.

5. Start a discussion with the media on reporting terrorism

Australian media reporting of the December 2014 Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney was sensibly restrained, and local media outlets refused to broadcast demands made by the gunman. The media’s use of ISIL propaganda videos, particularly of purported executions, has also become noticeably more restrained in recent months. This approach reflects the difficult balance that media organisations try to keep between informed reporting and inflaming tensions. There are many examples in which reporting has been less than helpful, either...
by broadcasting the latest ISIL video or by using headlines that generate community anger rather than inform people.

Under its mandate for ‘promoting good standards of media practice’ the Australian Press Council developed advisory guidelines for the use of religious terms in headlines:

The Press Council advises newspapers and magazines to be careful about using in their headlines terms for religious or ethnic groups that could imply that the group as a whole was responsible for the actions of a minority among that group. The use of the words ‘Islam’, ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim’ in headlines on reports of terrorist attacks has caused problems both for the Muslim community in Australia and the Australian media. (APC, 2004)

In addition to restating that advice, an updated set of guidelines should consider:

- Appropriate terminology to describe ISIL
- Handling strategies for using ISIL’s and other terrorist organisation’s propaganda (both violent material and non-violent recruitment videos)
- The suitability of adapting media standards for reporting on suicide and depression to reporting about individuals vulnerable to radicalisation
- The reporting of matters relating to the Muslim community in the context of terrorism.

The best way to develop a new advisory guideline would be for the government to start an open dialogue with a wide range of media representatives and, ultimately, for the Press Council to codify its own recommendations. Because of our engagement with government agencies and with the media, ASPI is prepared to assist in further developing this proposal.

6. Develop individual case management strategies for at-risk people

The government’s Living Safe Together initiative, which began in August 2014, emphasises the importance of early identification and early intervention to assist people who are on a path to radicalisation and divert them onto more productive paths.

The Living Safe Together website points to “Intervention programmes [that] may include youth diversion activities, healthcare initiatives, mentoring, employment and educational pathway support and counselling” (AGD, n.d.e). This reflects a broadening of the government’s approach to cover counter-terrorism mitigation strategies that include social services delivery. This approach offers promising possibilities, but a great deal of additional work will need to be done to define how an intervention process might work, where authority to decide to intervene will reside, and how to handle an individual from the point of intervention. The handover point from law enforcement to social service agencies will need careful definition, as will the nature of cooperation between federal and state agencies and community groups. Early and important work is already underway in this area, but much more needs to be done.

An important starting point to think through what’s needed to manage people being diverted from radicalisation would be to bring security and social services delivery agencies together to discuss cooperation. These are different worlds, so substantial give and take will be needed to develop a shared understanding. The value of a successful diversion program would be great, given the massive costs of policing operations to thwart terror plots and the human and social costs of terrorist acts.

7. Combat online propaganda

Online propaganda produced by ISIL and other terrorist groups presents a different and more serious threat than al-Qaeda’s slower and stodgier efforts of a decade ago:

- Production values are higher, and the products are designed to appeal to people with a false image of the adventure that awaits a radicalised recruit
- Response times in producing propaganda are faster, so producers can take advantage of current developments being reported by mainstream media
- Online presentation is not diluted by media outlets and can easily be switched to other sites if internet service providers or governments block distribution
- A receptive audience seeks the product and can be reached globally
- The online environment facilitates networking and the broader dissemination of the propaganda.

These qualities of the online environment make combating ISIL propaganda more challenging. However, the internet’s just a channel: the key task for counter-terrorism is to undermine the content of the propagandist’s message.

A major ASPI study by Roslyn Richardson, Fighting fire with fire: target audience responses to online anti-violence campaigns, found in November 2013 that government online counter-radicalisation campaigns were unlikely to succeed (Richardson 2013). Based on detailed research with young Muslims in Sydney, Richardson found that young people were unlikely to trust governments, didn’t regard them as being on the same side, and didn’t consider that CVE strategies addressed issues of most importance to them. The report recommended that governments assist efforts underway within the Muslim community to develop the community’s own alternative online material opposing radicalisation. This approach needs to be complemented by face-to-face engagement, a process of trust building, recognition of the importance of selecting the right language to describe the problem, and an understanding of the significant differences of attitude that exist within the Muslim community.

Where government offers content online, it needs to ensure that this material has the quality, timeliness, reach and attention to language that’s needed to engage and
persuade a sceptical audience. For a number of years, the
government, with the Attorney-General’s Department
leading the way, has assisted in developing thinking
about online counter-radicalisation. The need now is
to deploy a range of responses able to rapidly change
to meet new propaganda challenges and to find ways to
build community acceptance. Harnessing the expertise
of communication, marketing and social media experts
could facilitate this. Some $21 million has been spent
so far on limiting the impact of terrorist narratives on
domestic audiences (AGD, n.d. b).

8. Revise the public terrorism advisory system
Anthony Bergin and Clare Murphy (2015) have
pointed out the following about Australia’s threat and
warning system.

Our usually classified terrorism threat level and
public alert level were both raised to ‘high’ in September
2014. This was the first time that ASIO made the
threat level public and raised it to ‘high’. We’d been on
medium level for 13 years. There was some confusion
about how the public was supposed to react to the
raised alert level, and about the role that terrorism
advisories play in our counter-terrorism machinery.

Five immediate changes could help. First, it would
be sensible to collapse the two systems into one
public alert system, decided by the Director-General
of ASIO, that can be made public and accompanied
by an unclassified narrative. Second, there should be
a sunset clause that mandates the expiry of a raised
level after six months unless there’s evidence that
it shouldn’t be changed. Third, a generic alert level
system isn’t appropriate for a country as large as
Australia. Our terrorism warning system should offer
more advice about likely areas at increased risk. This
would strengthen the system as an effective tool for
communicating useful information to the public.

Our fourth suggestion is that the language used
for terrorism advisories shouldn’t be arbitrary or
ambiguous. It would be prudent to test the narratives,
and especially what the system suggests that people do,
at each level to see how useful the public finds them.
Finally, a public awareness campaign communicating
any changes to our terrorism advisories would be
helpful. This should include social media. The Australian
Government should have a national security Facebook
page and Twitter account to provide information on
terrorism warnings. We set out the case for these changes
in more detail in our study, Sounding the alarm: terrorism
threat communications with the Australian public (Bergin
& Murphy, 2015).

9. Explain how government agencies
use counter-terrorism powers
The Australian Parliament has given law enforcement
and intelligence agencies extensive new powers to deal
with the terrorism threat. While some measures have
been controversial, experience to date has shown these
changes to be necessary and proportional. Australian
agencies are also deeply engaged in counter-terrorism
operations here and overseas and conduct many
cooperative activities with international partners.
However, community support for these powers and
actions is essential for maintaining confidence in the
existing arrangements and for arguing the case for any
future additions or expansions to powers.

Australian governments, through COAG, should
promote confidence in our agencies by presenting
a 12-monthly public update on the use of counter-
terrorism powers in Australia. That report should
include all information required by law (for example,
reporting on the use of delayed notification warrants
and the data retention scheme) but also detailed infor-
mation on relevant matters such as the use of control
orders, passport cancellations, numbers of continuing
investigations, individuals referred for diversion
programs, international cooperation activities, relevant
financial actions, court outcomes, and reporting
about police and military operations. Of course, the
report should respect the privacy of individuals and
the security of intelligence and operations. Beyond
that, it should present a comprehensive explanation
of how and why the agencies have used their powers,
and what’s been done in the Australian public’s name
to suppress terrorism here and overseas.

Authors: Anthony Bergin, Michael Clifford, David Connery,
Tobias Feakin, Ken Gleiman, Stephanie Huang, Grace
Hutchison, Peter Jennings, David Lang, Amelia Long, Clare
Murphy, Simone Roworth, Rosalyn Turner, Samina Yasmeen.

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Jennings, P, editor (June 2015). Gen Y jihadists:
preventing radicalisation in Australia, Chapter 5, pp. 51-56.
WORKSHEETS AND ACTIVITIES

The Exploring Issues section comprises a range of ready-to-use worksheets featuring activities which relate to facts and views raised in this book.

The exercises presented in these worksheets are suitable for use by students at middle secondary school level and beyond. Some of the activities may be explored either individually or as a group.

As the information in this book is compiled from a number of different sources, readers are prompted to consider the origin of the text and to critically evaluate the questions presented.

Is the information cited from a primary or secondary source? Are you being presented with facts or opinions?

Is there any evidence of a particular bias or agenda? What are your own views after having explored the issues?

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Brainstorm, individually or as a group, to find out what you know about terrorism and violent extremism.

1. **What is terrorism?**

2. **What is violent extremism?**

3. **What are the distinctions between terrorism and violent extremism?**

4. **What is radicalisation?**
Complete the following activity on a separate sheet of paper if more space is required.

Since 2001, Australia has enacted over 60 counter-terrorism laws. These laws contain a wide range of criminal offences and grant broad investigative powers to the police and intelligence agencies. Many of these laws infringe upon fundamental human rights by restricting the rights to liberty, privacy, and the freedoms of speech, movement, and association.

Human Rights Law Centre (2015), Australia’s human rights score card: counter-terrorism.

Consider the above statement, and in the space below list the pros and cons of at least three of Australia’s most controversial counter-terrorism laws. In your response, consider whether or not certain these laws should be repealed, or the powers invested in them sustained or increased, and explain why.

There is no single pathway of radicalisation towards violent extremism, as the process is unique to each person. However, there are some common elements in the experiences of most people who have become radicalised in Australia, regardless of their beliefs or motivations.

Living Safe Together (Australian Government), Understanding the radicalisation process.

What are the common elements in the experiences of most people who have been radicalised in Australia? What non-violent measures can the Australian community take to counter the radicalisation of young Australians and prevent them from participating in violent extremism or terrorist acts?
Complete the following multiple choice questionnaire by circling or matching your preferred responses.

1. Match the following terms to their correct definitions.
   a. Control order
   b. Preventive detention
   c. Radicalisation
   d. Terrorism
   e. Violent extremism

   1. Beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals.
   2. Use or threatened use of violence in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim.
   3. Detaining people in police custody when there is a threat of an imminent terrorist attack or immediately after a terrorist attack.
   4. Court-issued order intended to restrict a person’s liberty to aid in the prevention a terrorist attack or if the person has trained with a listed terrorist organisation.
   5. Occurs when a person’s thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically.

2. Which of the following are considered to be terrorist organisations by the Australian government? (circle all that apply)
   a. Abu Sayyaf Group
   b. Al-Qa’ida
   c. Boko Haram
   d. Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
   e. Hizballah’s External Security Organisation
   f. Islamic State
   g. Jemaah Islamiyah
   h. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

3. Which of the following are NOT among the 5 listed National Terrorism Threat Levels? (circle all that apply)
   a. Certain
   b. Inevitable
   c. Expected
   d. Probable
   e. Improbable
   f. Not expected
   g. Unexpected

4. Since 2001, how many Australians have been killed in terrorist attacks in public places?
   a. Under 10
   b. Under 100
   c. 100–200
   d. 1,000–2,000
   e. 3,000–4,000
   f. 5,000–6,000

   1 – a = 4, b = 3, c = 5, d = 2, e = 1 ; 2 = a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ; 3 = b, e, g ; 4 = c.
• Of the last 16 years (as at 2015), the worst year for terrorism was 2014 with 93 countries experiencing an attack and 32,765 people killed (Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016). (p.2)

• Over 90 per cent of all terrorism attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of state-sponsored terror – extra-judicial deaths, torture and imprisonment without trial (ibid). (p.4)

• Thirty-three per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries with high levels of state-sponsored terror – extra-judicial deaths, torture and imprisonment without trial (ibid). (p.4)

• Terrorism is violence aimed at achieving political or ideological objectives. Attacks can be centrally directed from a structured organisation or network or by individuals acting without any direct external control (the so-called ‘lone wolf’) (Commonwealth Government, Terrorist Threat Worldwide, Smartraveller). (p.5)

• There is a continuing and longstanding threat of terrorist attack across the world. Since 2000, there has been a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising to 32,685 in 2014. The countries with the most number of attacks include Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria (ibid). (p.5)

• Since 2001, over 100 Australians have been killed in terrorist attacks in public places. These attacks include: the attack in Tunis on the Bardo National Museum on 18 March 2015; the attack in Nairobi on Westgate Mall in 2013; the attacks in Jakarta on the Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels in 2009; the attacks in Mumbai on the Taj and Trident Hotels in 2008; Bali bombings of 2005; the Jakarta Marriott bombing of 2003; the Bali nightclub bombings of 2002; the World Trade Center attacks in New York in 2001 (ibid). (p.7)

• Over the past decade, Australians have been kidnapped and held hostage by terrorists in Somalia, Syria, the southern Philippines and Burkina Faso. Substantial ransoms have been demanded for their release. The Australian Government’s longstanding policy is that it does not make payments or concessions to kidnappers. The Australian Government considers that paying a ransom increases the risk of further kidnappings, including other Australians (ibid). (p.7)

• Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy outlines the current terrorist threat that Australia is facing, and what our governments are doing to counter it. It focuses on five core elements: challenging violent extremist ideologies, stopping people from becoming terrorists, shaping the global environment to counter terrorism, disrupting terrorist activity within Australia and having effective responses and recovery should an attack occur (Australian National Security, Frequently asked questions). (p.12)

• More Australians have died at the hands of police (lawfully or unlawfully) in ten years (so at least from 2006 to 2015) or from domestic violence in just two years (more than 318 in 2014 and 2015) than from terrorist attacks in Australia in the last 20 years (Austin, G, Australians have little to fear from terrorism at home – here’s why). (p.14)

• Although Australia’s terrorism threat level is set at probable, the likelihood of an individual being killed or wounded from a terrorist attack in this country is extremely low. Terrorist attacks in Australia have claimed the lives of only three victims in the last two decades (ibid). (p.14)

• Australian fears are necessarily shaped by memories of the 2002 Bali terrorist attacks in which 202 people, many of them Australian, were killed. Since Bali, terrorist attacks overseas have claimed the lives of more than 110 Australians (ibid). (p.14)

• Countering violent extremism is a shared effort between all Australian governments. The objective of the countering violent extremism programme is to combat the threat posed by home-grown terrorism and to discourage Australians from travelling overseas to participate in conflicts (Attorney-General’s Department, Countering violent extremism). (p.18)

• Since 2001, Australia has enacted over 60 counter-terrorism laws. These laws contain a wide range of criminal offences and grant broad investigative powers to the police and intelligence agencies. Many of these laws infringe upon fundamental human rights by restricting the rights to liberty, privacy, and the freedoms of speech, movement, and association (Human Rights Law Centre, Australia’s 2015 UPR-NGO Coalition, Fact Sheet 7). (p.28)

• Violent extremism is the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. This includes terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and communal violence (Living Safe Together, What is violent extremism?). (p.34)

• There are many different types of violent extremism. Motivations are varied and many usually relate to particular ideologies (for example, interpretations of political movements or religious beliefs), issues such as environmental or economic concerns, or ethnic or separatist causes. People can also be motivated by more than one issue (ibid). (p.34)

• Radicalisation happens when a person’s thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically. Only small numbers of people radicalise and they can be from a diverse range of ethnic, national, political and religious groups (Living Safe Together, What is radicalisation?). (p.35)

• As a person radicalises they may begin to seek to change significantly the nature of society and government. However, if someone decides that using fear, terror or violence is justified to achieve ideological, political or social change – this is violent extremism (ibid). (p.35)

• The factors that result in radicalisation are complex and varied. They include individual psychology, personal and group identity, demographics, individual circumstances and contact with radicalising settings or influences, including personal contact with recruiters or influential people (Aly, A, Radicalisation and the lone wolf: what we do and don’t know). (p.40)
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The police can detain people under preventative detention expected, probable, possible, and not expected. A scale of five levels use used by the Australian Government to provide advice about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia. The levels are: certain, expected, probable, possible, and not expected.

Counter-terrorism powers
Incorporates the practice, military tactics, techniques, and strategy that government, military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism.

Declared area offence
It is an offence for a person to intentionally enter, or remain in, a declared area in a foreign country where the person is reckless to the fact that the area is a declared area. The maximum penalty for this offence is 10 years imprisonment. The Minister for Foreign Affairs may declare an area in a foreign country if satisfied that a listed terrorist organisation is engaging in a hostile activity in that area.

Financing terrorism
Involves the intentional collection or provision of funds and recklessness as to whether the funds will be used to facilitate or engage in a terrorist act. It does not matter if a terrorist act does not occur, or if the funds will not be used for a specific terrorist act or for more than one terrorist act.

Islamism
Islamic revivalist movement, characterised by moral conservatism, literalism and the attempt to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life.

Lone wolves
Individuals who commit acts of violence in support of a group, though they may have no formal links to that group.

National security
The requirement to maintain the survival of the nation state through economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. Security threats may involve nation states or terrorist organisations, narcotic cartels and multi-national organisations.

National Terrorism Threat Advisory System
A scale of five levels use used by the Australian Government to provide advice about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia. The levels are: certain, expected, probable, possible, and not expected.

Preventative detention
The police can detain people under preventative detention orders only where there is a threat of an imminent terrorist attack or immediately after a terrorist attack has occurred. Individuals can be detained if it is necessary to prevent an imminent terrorist act or if it is likely vital evidence in the aftermath of a terrorist act will be lost. Under Commonwealth law, the maximum amount of time a person can be preventatively detained is 48 hours. Under state and territory laws, a person can be detained for up to 14 days.

Radicalisation
Radicalisation happens when a person’s thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate politically. Only small numbers of people radicalise and they can be from a diverse range of ethnic, national, political and religious groups. If someone decides that using fear, terror or violence is justified to achieve ideological, political or social change – this is violent extremism.

Terrorism
The use or threatened use of violence (terror) in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim.

Terrorist act
An act, or a threat to commit an act, that is done with the intention of coercing or influencing the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause, and the act causes: death, serious harm or endangers a person; serious damage to property; serious risk to the health or safety of the public; or seriously interferes with, disrupts or destroys critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network. A person found guilty of committing a terrorist act could face up to life imprisonment.

Terrorist act offence
It is an offence to: commit a terrorist act; plan or prepare for a terrorist act; finance terrorism or a terrorist; provide or receive training connected with terrorist acts; possess things connected with terrorist acts; or collect or make documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts. A person may be convicted of a terrorist act offence if the person intends to commit one of these offences or if the person was reckless as to whether his or her actions would amount to a terrorist act. A person may still commit a terrorist act offence even though a terrorist act did not occur.

Terrorist organisation
Defined as an organisation that: a court finds is either directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act; or an organisation that has been listed by the Government.

Violent extremism
Beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals – this includes terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and communal violence.
Websites with further information on the topic

- Australian Strategic Policy Institute  [www.aspi.org.au](http://www.aspi.org.au)
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  [www.dfat.gov.au](http://www.dfat.gov.au)
- Institute for Economics and Peace  [www.economicsandpeace.org](http://www.economicsandpeace.org)
- Lowy Institute for International Policy  [www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/terrorism](http://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/terrorism)

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